i definitely just wrote 3500 words explaining why government is not competent enough to manage all the public lands in this country. i want to rip my eyes out.
"The Forest Service, like any other government bureaucracy, acts in a manner consistent with a non-profit oriented entity. Because an annually expanding budget is the bureaus primary goal, non-price indicators are used in decision-making. Efficiency and the very goods provision that was the departments initial responsibility (a stable and untouched ecosystem in ANWRs case) are generally not delivered. One troubling incentive created by this is the under-provision of goods in order to be able to demand more money during the next budget appropriations. The bureau has little incentive to minimize costs for the same reasons. By minimizing the costs of provision or failing to spend the last years budget, it might appear to legislators that the bureau would need fewer resources to accomplish the same tasks. Without an unambiguous standard of performance, such as a profit and loss statement, to guide the bureau or its legislative supervisors, the bureau will wish to minimize legislative scrutiny; justify expanding its service provision; and spend all of its budgetary appropriations."
"There are numerous examples when mismanagement goes unchecked, such as in 1995 when the Forest Service could not account for $215 million of its $3.4 billion operating budget2. Obviously, there is a systemic problem wherein the incentives toward transparency and enforcement of regulations are absent."
"One of the consequences of the nature of public lands is this tendency toward ineffective preference expression reflected through lobbying and rent-seeking. When non-price signals are used to express these preferences, there arise problems of accurately understanding various participants demand (true willingness to pay) for a given good. In the case of most public lands, it is the classic tragedy of the commons, wherein everyone owns the property, and in a way this leads to no one actually owning it. Therefore excessive consumption and rational myopia occur. It is in each individuals best interest to consume as much as possible, and to do it as quickly as they can."
"Rather than to efficacy, regulators will for political reasons be attracted to policies that exhibit visible solution[s] of command and control and other electoral logic practices like concentrating benefits to a specific voting group while dispersing costs over a larger population. In the case of ANWR, politicians have been so far unsuccessful in bringing negotiations forward with environmental groups because the vote-loss that could result from drilling on one of the most bio-diverse areas on the planet. A final significant implication of centralized environmental decision-making is the phenomenon wherein fears of environmental havoc cause a shift of decisions toward zero riskprocesses. As just mentioned, costs are spread over the entire population while benefits are concentrated to those near the site of policy implementation. The implication is that certain small groups have a strong incentive to invest in lobbying, and those who shouldered the cost do not. Therefore policies that are likely not in the interest of the population are enacted."
"What the environmental movement must realize is that demand for environmental quality is no different than demand for anything else. The environment is not an all-or-nothing good, but a bundle of different goods. Furthermore, as incomes rise, people demand more of these environmental goods."
"However with environmental issues, as in ANWR, problems can arise. Because environmental goods are often indivisible, it is incredibly difficult to assess costs and benefits at the individual level. This poses major challenges for basic markets. Current thinking suggests the use of regulation (to substitute government coercion for individual choice). This is often counterproductive, leading to non-optimal results. Certainly this is the case in Alaska. Nominal limits to pollution, technology requirements, or prohibitive regulations do not take into account location-specific and ever-changing information critical to all production and consumption decisions. Performance standards allow individuals decide how they are best equipped to meet guidelines. Organizations like PERC and other pro-market groups stress the importance of a fundamental shift away from an approach of primarily regulatory and punitive to one that emphasizes bargaining, improvement in information flows, and incentives for stewardship."
boring yet? those are the good parts.
"The Forest Service, like any other government bureaucracy, acts in a manner consistent with a non-profit oriented entity. Because an annually expanding budget is the bureaus primary goal, non-price indicators are used in decision-making. Efficiency and the very goods provision that was the departments initial responsibility (a stable and untouched ecosystem in ANWRs case) are generally not delivered. One troubling incentive created by this is the under-provision of goods in order to be able to demand more money during the next budget appropriations. The bureau has little incentive to minimize costs for the same reasons. By minimizing the costs of provision or failing to spend the last years budget, it might appear to legislators that the bureau would need fewer resources to accomplish the same tasks. Without an unambiguous standard of performance, such as a profit and loss statement, to guide the bureau or its legislative supervisors, the bureau will wish to minimize legislative scrutiny; justify expanding its service provision; and spend all of its budgetary appropriations."
"There are numerous examples when mismanagement goes unchecked, such as in 1995 when the Forest Service could not account for $215 million of its $3.4 billion operating budget2. Obviously, there is a systemic problem wherein the incentives toward transparency and enforcement of regulations are absent."
"One of the consequences of the nature of public lands is this tendency toward ineffective preference expression reflected through lobbying and rent-seeking. When non-price signals are used to express these preferences, there arise problems of accurately understanding various participants demand (true willingness to pay) for a given good. In the case of most public lands, it is the classic tragedy of the commons, wherein everyone owns the property, and in a way this leads to no one actually owning it. Therefore excessive consumption and rational myopia occur. It is in each individuals best interest to consume as much as possible, and to do it as quickly as they can."
"Rather than to efficacy, regulators will for political reasons be attracted to policies that exhibit visible solution[s] of command and control and other electoral logic practices like concentrating benefits to a specific voting group while dispersing costs over a larger population. In the case of ANWR, politicians have been so far unsuccessful in bringing negotiations forward with environmental groups because the vote-loss that could result from drilling on one of the most bio-diverse areas on the planet. A final significant implication of centralized environmental decision-making is the phenomenon wherein fears of environmental havoc cause a shift of decisions toward zero riskprocesses. As just mentioned, costs are spread over the entire population while benefits are concentrated to those near the site of policy implementation. The implication is that certain small groups have a strong incentive to invest in lobbying, and those who shouldered the cost do not. Therefore policies that are likely not in the interest of the population are enacted."
"What the environmental movement must realize is that demand for environmental quality is no different than demand for anything else. The environment is not an all-or-nothing good, but a bundle of different goods. Furthermore, as incomes rise, people demand more of these environmental goods."
"However with environmental issues, as in ANWR, problems can arise. Because environmental goods are often indivisible, it is incredibly difficult to assess costs and benefits at the individual level. This poses major challenges for basic markets. Current thinking suggests the use of regulation (to substitute government coercion for individual choice). This is often counterproductive, leading to non-optimal results. Certainly this is the case in Alaska. Nominal limits to pollution, technology requirements, or prohibitive regulations do not take into account location-specific and ever-changing information critical to all production and consumption decisions. Performance standards allow individuals decide how they are best equipped to meet guidelines. Organizations like PERC and other pro-market groups stress the importance of a fundamental shift away from an approach of primarily regulatory and punitive to one that emphasizes bargaining, improvement in information flows, and incentives for stewardship."
boring yet? those are the good parts.