signalnoise

So, here's what's bugging the shit out of me:

How do policies spread from one state to another state? In a more generalizable sense, we might ask: How do institutional forms migrate from one organization to another organization in an environment where those organizations are essentially autonomous (re: not already a part of a centralized field)? And - what happens to those policies as they spread from place to place?

Obviously, we're still talking about railroads here. And state politics. The basic problem is that we know states interaction with one another. When one state enacts a given policy, other states are watching - and copy that policy. Why would they copy? Well, primarily because states are competitive actors - vying for populations and resources. So in one state enacts a snazzy new program (or cuts out an expensive, unnecessary one), other states very much are pressured to follow through with similar programs.

There are two distinct, stylized stories that explain how this might happen:

1. State A enacts a policy. States B - n essentially copy that exact policy. In this case, convergence is the most rational outcome b/c of competitive pressure. [This is kind of a ridiculous story that really ignores the unique pressures and advantages different municipalities face.]

2. States A - n[/n] are all facing some similar problem. Each state develops their own distinct plan that has is unique to that state. [This situation is actually really unlikely, and would more likely be seen when comparing even-more independent nation-states - especially in non-competitive bureaucratic realms - rather than in small-s province style "states." But it is a possibility.]

I hesitate to posit either of these theories as strong interlocutors - but they're also not quite straw men either. But I think they basically posit the two big theories about how organizations in a competitive field might develop new institutions.

So not only are these really unsatisfactory - they also don't really address just how it is that policies diffuse from one state to another. That's just sort of black boxed. I mean, there are theories out there about that - but it is a bit vague.

What I'm starting to play about with is a sort of three stage process of policy diffusion, with the end result being what I call "minimal coordination." In the first stage - emulation - states become aware of policies in other states, and seek to enact a similar policy. In terms of agent of diffusion, I focus on particular competitive interest groups within the state. In other words, state policies - even "public good" policies that might be indivisible and benefit all - are driven by competing actors *inside* the state, rather than at the level of the government itself. Thus, after State A tries out a new policy, within State/Organization B, there is a conflict among various factions over whether the new policy will be enacted. So, then, states taking on new policies because of nearby action is not a given - it is a political process.

Which leads to the second stage - adaptation. Since the policy is being enacted at the behest of interests, they have a unique circumstance that sets them apart from their competitions in other states: it may be different resources, geography, economy, political context - anything. The result is that while the basic policy structure is borrowed from another state - it is realized in a form unique to that state. I don't think any of this is very surprising.

I'm hoping this is more interesting stage: coordination. As several states enact a policy, one state is going to come to dominate the policy arena. In other words, one state is going to find the best way to provide that public good. Or, one state is going to supply the *most* of that public good within its borders, leading it to dominate and overflow and impact how the structure of that good works in other environments. Think about a state that is extracting some resource, like coal, and sets certain standards that become industry standards because that state pulls out the most coal. How do other states respond to this? In a pure rational choice model, states should start to just readjust to the hegemonic actor. But I don't buy that: the prior interests in that state still exist, and there are path dependent problems too - institutions don't like to change course. BUT they need to do something to succeed - so they build *bridging* elements to their institutions, that link them to the dominant institution without actually fully copying the dominant state's system. They keep elements of their own approach, but tweak it to work with others, just enough. Minimal coordination.

My problem - first, I'm not sure this is interesting/surprising. Second. I'm not sure it's true. Like, how does it apply to policies like welfare or lotteries or health care? These are fairly internal... it works really great for MY area of interest of railroads: once one state become the central hub, other states might continue with their own rail projects while building reluctant links to the new hub in order to still prosper. I think really what I might be looking at is just an iterated game, where strategies change at each round. But see: I'm wary of that too, because I don't know if those powerful interests in other, non-dominant states will ever *fully* accede to dropping their own preferences. That's what's killing me. I'm not sure if what I'm saying is even *different* from an iterated game or not. I feel like it might be, but maybe that's because I'm in denial and gussying it up unnecessarily.

Blah.