Ideology: as viewed through the texts of Marx and Mannheim
The political and social world around us was not created, nor is it sustained, by innate reflex. It is the construction, the situation, the product of the actions of individuals. These actions, occurring within this social arena, and to a great extent, without, are shaped, to varying degrees, by some form of thought. In a general sense, action is just a response to individual and collective encounters with problems. Yet the specific actions and the individually specific definition or interpretation of the problem which precedes such actions - present an interesting question itself. Specifically, it calls forth the question of why the situation, why the object, why the problem is viewed in that specific way by the individual, and further, why the resultant action of the individual occurs in the specific ways that it does. If individuals across all divides, geo-cultural, historic-temporal, categorizations of class, race, agency/ability, etc., viewed situations and objects identically, this question would not exist. But it does. Values, events, concepts, etc., in short, life itself, seems to be open for interpretation. As such, a critical question emerges concerning the practicality, the merit, and even the very validity of an individuals perceptions with respect to the influence it has upon the actions of a distinctly intentioned individual within society. Author Terry Eagleton presents a definition of Ideology as the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world. It is in this context that I wish to approach the subject.
Within the political arena, labels abound. Labels like Conservative, Neo-liberal, Progressive, et al, suggest certain world-views, certain hierarchies of priority and arguably - to most individuals using them - even the value of the viewpoint expressed by an individual bearing such a label. Without attempting to prescribe our own judgments on the ideas represented by these labels in terms of the world-views they reflect, we can still take a look at how these views affect individuals. We can address the practical matter of how individuals whether they adopt such labels, or identify with aspects of the views they represent, come to understand their world. Perhaps in doing so, we will be able to move beyond the petty categorization and subsequent marginalization of differing forms or opposing modes of thought and advance the discourse of our current situation beyond the playground/primetime dichotomies of us vs. them.
Central to this discussion will be the texts of Karl Marxs The German Ideology and Karl Mannheims Ideology & Utopia. Both works deal specifically with the question of how individuals obtain the views which in turn impact their conduct within the social arena. Despite their differences, both share a fundamental assertion, namely, that ones world-view is not their own. Perhaps in the context of ownership, one could argue that it is; but in the context of authorship, such a view is viewed as wholly false. Individuals do not obtain their full understanding and knowledge of the world through their own means; Ideas, concepts, thoughts and beliefs are not obtained solely through some isolated and purely deductive or inductive method of reasoning that somehow arises through individual experience. To reinforce this last statement, it could be alluded that the probability that anyone reading this paper has ever clocked the speed of light inside a vacuum at 186,281 miles per second, proved that the earth is round one lazy summer, or taken some vacation time to verify that Plate Tectonics is the cause of earthquakes is virtually nil. However, few individuals inside the realm of group life would challenge these beliefs. If asked if these three statements were true, the majority of learned individuals would state that these assertions are, in fact, true. These assertions have become common truths; they are assumed by individuals to have been proven in the past, and have been incorporated into the collective of agreed-upon facts we all understand as rational Knowledge.
This brings to the discussion what Karl Mannheim views as the social character of knowledge. Knowledge has social roots. It is acquired by the individual through relationships with the natural and the social world, as well as through the individuals and the objects within it. According to Mannheim, knowledge is from the very beginning a co-operative process of group life, in which everyone unfolds his knowledge within the framework of a common fate, a common activity Individuals do not obtain their ideas solely from the data of their own experiences, they also learn from others. They learn through inference and through the juxtaposition with the external world. Mannheim held that during his time, the critical flaw of epistemology - the study of the nature of knowledge - was this belief that individuals were somehow self-sufficient in their capacity of obtaining a pure knowledge. It was wrong in Mannheims view to proceed along such lines of inquiry assuming that the individual produced his knowledge of the world from within himself alone, Furthermore, he argued, these very experiences (from which this fictitiously self-sufficient individual obtains such data) themselves are not individually controlled by the subject seeking this objective world-view. Nor could it be argued that the social actor proceeds from a definitively neutral station somehow devoid of beliefs or ideas either wholly created or influenced by others. Even the contexts and situational dynamics of the experiences, especially within the political and social arena, are largely created and influenced not only by surrounding actors but by preceding generations of actors, by those who came before. The argument that the knowledge which an individual possesses is a collection of their own creation is fundamentally flawed.
Mannheim even pointed out that if one believed that the opposite was true in their particular* case, they would still be hard-pressed to believe that somehow all other actors, all other members of society, were similarly engaged in the construction of their own world-views and that somehow it is through a form of discourse or dialogue, based upon the collective rationality of all individuals, whereby society arrived at a similarly rational and correct idea of how the world should be viewed. Such individual thought for Mannheim, was the rare exception, not the rule. Collective thoughtcollective rational thought--would be just that much rarer still. Individuals obtained their ideas, their views, the totality of their knowledge in some other way. Mannheim felt they learned, instead, directly through their interactions with others, through the society in which they find themselves and the resources and objects within that society, and more specifically from within their position in that society. For him, Knowing is fundamentally collective knowing The largest part of thought is erected upon a basis of collective actions It was this understanding that provided the impetus for attempting to understand the influence of the collective unconscious, the group mind, or the predominant/prevailing ideas of reality and their effect on the ideas possessed by the individual. Once the faade of the individuals authorship of their own ideas is stripped away, the importance of understanding the framework of ideas surrounding the individual finally emerges. When this understanding is applied to the social and political actions of individuals, the question of the genesis of this frameworkthe beliefs and views adopted by the individual--raises certain questions regarding both practical conduct within the social sphere and individual responsibility in the propagation of support of any unexamined framework or the of which it is composed within the discursive or rhetorical sphere.
Marx, too, placed great emphasis on the social nature of thought. Consciousness, for Marx was nothing but the consciousness of existing practice. Consciousness exists within a social matrix, and as such retains a social character at all times. For an individual at some stage to imagine that they would or could separate themselves from this matrix to operate with the realm of ideals and arrive at something real, was utterly incorrect for Marx. It is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own Once consciousness was viewed as anything other than the awareness of the current situation, once it became the point of genesis regarding concepts, ideals, mores, or served in and of itself as the primary means of justifying social conditions it assumed a role which it was no longer adequately suited to fulfill. Marx was speaking directly to the role which consciousness played in the existing practices of the division of labor at the time, but this illustrates a critical point that should be understood by anyone not familiar with the work of Marx. His was not a philosophical discussion of Ideology, knowledge, consciousness or whatever other term one wishes to ascribe, in and of itself. Marx nearly always tied any concept back to his primary interest regarding the situations surrounding the practical existence of individuals. There was no inquiry into ancillary subjects solely for the purpose of understanding the subject in abstract manners; it was only in understanding the ways in which the subject affected material life that the pursuit held any usefulness for Marx. For this reason it is extremely difficult to discuss Marxs views on Ideology in the text, as such, without discussing the larger body of social analysis found within. Mannheim, by contrast, maintained a more focused approach on the subject, or from a more Marxist position, a more isolated study of Ideology a few degrees apart from the material. Building on the thoughts of those that came before him, Mannheim considered all social activity (and of course, political conduct is a division of within this larger category) to occur within two distinct, yet connected, spheres: The Rational and the Irrational. It is important however, to note the context in which Mannheim uses these adjectives. Every social process may be divided into a rationalized sphere consisting of settled and routinized procedures in dealing with situations that recur in an orderly fashion, and the irrational by which it is surrounded. For him, the recurring and clearly defined structures within societylaw, protocol, standardized etiquette, rules of order--constitute the rational; all the political and social activity surrounding itdebate, revolution, the tackling of new problems outside of previously formalized methodsthis was the playground of the irrational. But even as this rational sphere, the law for example, is obviously the product of some historical process, to view it as the end-result of historical attempts to address problematic issues is also false. It is not the end result of anything. Political mechanisms, social structures, civilization itself are in a constant state of flux. They are always in the process of becoming; always changing. The structures of the rational ultimately occur within the framework of the irrational and are subject to its influence in this temporal process. To continue the example of lawoccurring in the formalized or rational sphere--one has only to look back within our own recent history to see how laws addressing issues of, say, racial equality were both established, re-enforced, challenged and changed through the irrationalthat is, the non-formalized, subjectivespheres of action based upon things such as self-interest, tradition and ideas of justice. Revisiting the question of individual authorship of their own ideas, specifically to the concept of knowledge, if one knows today that Plate Tectonics causes earthquakes, essentially, because they found themselves in a position in which someone told them so , why should similar individuals in 1950s Alabama doubt that blacks were inferior by nature and should be prohibited from holding the same rights as whites? After all, thats what they were told. That is what they knew. Their knowledge had roots which were not rationally obtained. Perhaps not all irrationally obtained knowledge results in such problematic situations, but it is easy to see through just this example how irrational knowledge or irrational ideologies create unjust situations at a substantial cost to the lives of individuals. And if this particular failure of knowledge which still manifests itself today, why would it be so hard to believe that similar ideologies surrounding us every day, creating their own tenets of knowledge, are coming to us at a similarly devastating cost?
Karl Marx had more than a few thoughts on how this concept of Ideology worked. He was extremely critical of the notions espoused up to and during his time that the ideas of any given generation somehow emerged as a product of pure thought. For Marx, individual consciousness was the result of concrete material situations surrounding the individual. (Either temporally or spatially to use one of Mannheims caveats) According to Marx, men must be in a position to live in order to be able to make history. But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. For Marx, it was through the manner in which these actions were collectively engaged in that individuals within that culture were able to form their ideas about the world, and practically how they should act within it. The realm of pure thought, to borrow a phrase from Marx, was grossly subordinate to the realm of practical existence in the construction of beliefs and ideas. Trading in the terms thought for consciousness we can see the first hint at this in his assertion that, Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process.
Put bluntly, what one did, how one ate, and where one slept, had a large impact on where one stood in the realm of ideas. How individuals managed to survive, how they managed to take care of the essential tasks of life, of existence, these were the processes by which their ideas were formed, not the other way around. Individuals have never collectively conceived of how society ought to be prior to their introduction to it and then set about the task of building just such a society. Instead, the ideas which came to them regarding how society ought to be were instead reactions to the modes of life that they themselves encountered. Individuals, in developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.
One of the more interesting themes throughout Marxs writings is his constant allusion to the fragmentation of society. He speaks of the division of labor which en masse turns mankind from what was historically a collection of self-sufficient creatures into a collective of increasingly specialized individuals no longer able to obtain for themselves that which is essential for their survival outside of society. Such dependence ties individuals not only to society itself but to the specific modes of conduct and at a deeper level, of thought, in which that society operates. This dependence, according to Marx, assumes the form of fetters, of chains. Furthermore, as a product of this specialization, of this division of labor, of resources, of influence, the interests of differing elements within society become fragmented. And so long as the actions of all individuals are determined by these dominant, yet materially-oblivious ideas concerning conduct, this broader ideology serves to enslave the individual. The very constituent parts of society, the family, the individuals, are bound to encounter problematic situations and begin to obtain myopic views or at least contradictory ideas of what is important, at a very real, material level when contrasted against the dominant interests of such a society as a whole. Theft, for example, may bring about anathema within such an advanced society. But contrasted against the need for bread by those who no longer have the means of acquiring it within the modes prescribed by that society, inside that situation, the material struggle for existence once again emerges as the precursor for the ideas of individual conduct. Some form of action is the inevitable result. Given the opportunity, in whatever form it takes, truly hungry people will not stay hungry for long. If one sleeps in the poor house, they may have opposing views from those who sleep elsewhere on how the resources of that society are allocated. Marxs critical assertion was that these ideas do not emerge within the realm of pure thought. They come before.
It is important to illustrate here that when Marx speaks of the dominant modes of thought or Ideologies of a given period and its influence upon the ideas adopted by individuals within that historical moment, Marx was not claiming that individual action or thought had an inevitable or predetermined situation-specific outcome. Indeed, this is implicit when he speaks of contradictions between the interests of society and individuals. Moments of crises, situations of material urgency created a tension between the prevailing Ideologies and the individuals engaging in thought or the subsequent activity of overcoming such problems. Instead, Marx was addressing how amidst the daily status quo, amidst the blindingly familiar processes by which individuals sustain their existence and in the absence of material crisis, the dominant modes of thought were the creation of those who held control of the material production of society.
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it..
Like all other ideas, these ruling ideas also came after the fact; they came from those who already ruled. These ideas expressed their interests, were formulated through their perspective. Afterwards, this totality of ideas was adopted by those members of society who did not influence such control. Further, the integration and adoption of such Ideas came not by consensus, not through discourse, not by way of philosophical inquiry, but rather through the daily practices required for existence which were controlled by this ruling class. It was this key principle which differentiates Marx from Mannheim on a certain level: For Mannheim, the framework of dominant thought was a societal construct that emerged from relational experience. For Marx, Ideology was a product created by a specific component of society, namely the ruling class. One allowed for the interplay of opposing forces in the construction of this dominant mode of thinking, the other held that Ideology was predicated upon false conceptions created and sustained by those controlling the material existence of society.
This is where Mannheim slips the noose that seems to snag Marx. In David McClellans Ideology, the assertion is that, for Marx, ideas became ideological when they were used to cover up the reality of situations, especially those situations concerning economic or social distribution of resources and when these ideas also served to justify this inequality. Ideology is based, surprisingly enough, on ideas or idealism. For Marx, views should be based on the real circumstances affecting individuals, materialism. In this separation of materialism and idealism as the basic paradigm of dominant thought, Marx felt that all Ideology served the purpose of an illusion serving to hide the real processes by which individuals should address the uneven distributions of resources within society. By extension, (and this is not McLellan nor is it directly quotable Marx) once these illusions were destroyed, Ideology itself would be destroyed and the truth of the current situation emerges. Ideology is intrinsically false for Marx. Hence we have an interesting hypothetical where once a situation occurs whereby the dominant thought of the day proceeds along a course which parallels Marxs own conception of how things should be, namely, that the ruling class no longer holds sway over mankinds thoughts and actions, the structure of ideas which emerge out of that reality are no longer Ideological despite the fact that individuals are certain to still be influenced by this new society and by the ideas surrounding the intercourse that emerges as a result of social activity within it. The influence of society remains the same in method, if not in message. This presents a problem for Marxs conception of Ideology. Marxs interest in the subject of Ideology seemed to be its role in the domination of the producing class of society, by those who held the means of material production.
Returning now to Mannheim, the purpose of understanding Ideology as such, as well as how it operated, was of importance to him not so much out of an ends-based motive, but so that thought may be adequately used in this collective process of existence. In as much as knowledge is in a sense is only those facts which are socially agreed upon, it was of fundamental importance that individuals understand the forces which were at play in the construction of this consensus. Whereas Marx addressed Ideology as ultimately false, Mannheim instead addressed falsities within this realm as ideological distortion. This allowed Mannheim to deal with the same forces which Marx attempted to call out, while still allowing for the concept of ideology to exist should all such distortions somehow be corrected. Ideological distortion and the subsequent false consciousness which it creates were of particular danger when, it obstructs comprehension of a reality which is the outcome of constant reorganization of the mental processes which make up our worlds It is necessary to concentrate our attention with greater intensity upon the task of determining which of all the ideas current are really valid in a given situation. According to Mannheim, individuals must be able to rationally access the concrete and ever-changing moment in order to ethically determine their conduct within society. He points out several instances where dogmatic notions of ethical practice based upon the traditionally dominant modes of social thinking, once applied to new and changed circumstances, cannot be automatically justified in such an application. If the ideas of conduct within a society are based upon the traditions of that society, then by the very nature that any society occurs in the context of becoming--that is, any society occurs as a sequence of moments or historical situations that are ever-changing--then what are these standards of behavior, if not Ideological, and how real, how practical are they in determining the ethical conduct of the individual in the current situation? It was through critical inquiries such as this that Mannheim sought not just to look for common place errors in rational thought, but instead to turn the inquiry to distorted mental structures themselves.
To this end, skepticism played a crucial role for Mannheim. One of the chief characteristics of the method of rational analysis of human behaviour was the presupposition that men were given to feigning and to deceiving their fellows. Even within narrow spheres of social life, within a neighborhood for example, the individuals within even that limited setting bring differing approaches towards their interpretations of any given experience, These approaches are based on their own histories, their previous experiences, their individual situation, position, et al. In the purely rational sphere the problem of understanding as it relates to the social concept of knowledge may boil down to the problem of interpretation. But in the irrational sphere of everyday life, this process of converting experience into socialized knowledge is influenced by actors who have definite interests. It is through this recognition of what Mannheim terms the psychology of interests which must have at its core a sense of skepticism, that individuals are able to discern for themselves, to the extent possible, the factual basis of the knowledge being created . It was through this awareness, using rationality coupled with skepticism, that Mannheim felt society could attempt to correct the ideologically distorted knowledge of a given era and best judge situations and conduct themselves accordingly.
One of the problems with this happening however, seemed to be the ways in which society itself was organized. Similar to Marx, Mannheim had real problems with the structure of society during his time. He illustrates his own thoughts on the division of labor and the resulting problems of perspective thus:
A society which in its division of labor and functional differentiation cannot offer to each individual a set of problems and fields of operation in which full initiative and individual judgment can be exercised, also cannot realize a thoroughgoing individualistic and rationalistic Weltanschauung which can aspire to become an effective social reality.
The same social modes of operation that Marx spoke of presented their own problems for Mannheim. For Mannheim the primacy wasnt so much a situation in which he seemed ultimately concerned for the plight of the common laborer who, according to Marx, suffered in an exploitative relationship, as much as it was the impact which such division held in this ongoing process of becoming. This division, which was only a particular aspect of the manner in which his society operated, did create a very real situation in which personal initiative and ability were stifled. In the very mechanical manners in which individuals handled their professional or productive lives, performing set tasks in just such a way, they were not actively engaged in matters which prepared them for the critical activity required of such individuals for the construction of an effective social reality. They simply had to do what they were told, Mannheim seems to argue, and as such the implication is that they were being somehow conditioned to accept things as they were given. Such a situation hardly lived up to his perception of the potential of life in a post-Enlightenment world. Even though Marx himself took serious exception to the assertions which came from the period of the Enlightenment it is not much of a stretch to imagine that he might agree with Mannheim on this point.
Marx and Mannheim had quite a bit in common. This approach to the analysis of concrete modes of existence, the division of labor referenced above for example, is just one common thread. It was only with this attention to the material, always keeping one foot in the gutter, with an eye on the objective reality of the current situations which compose individuals lives that one could effectively address or combat these ideas. It was incumbent in such an endeavor to, quite literally, keep it real. Attempting to formulate Ideas concerning individual existence through pure philosophy, outside the realm of the material, was of little interest or use for Mannheim. In fact, there was no such thing as existence as such beyond philosophical rhetoric which held minimal benefit in understanding the concrete forms society, as it actually existed. Individual existence was always a concrete historical form of social existence. It was always a particular type of existence. Mannheim was clear to illustrate how some of the ideas within society, especially those which had such mentally constructed origins, transcended the actual order through which society functioned. That is, certain ideas simply did not fit, functionally, within the actual structure of society which espoused them. The projection of their content was impossible without destroying the structures of the society itself.
The idea of Christian brotherly love, for instance, in a society founded on serfdom remains an unrealizable and, in this sense, ideological idea, even when the intended meaning is, in good faith, a motive in the conduct of the individual. To live consistently, in the light of Christian brotherly love, in a society which is not organized on the same principle is impossible. The individual in his personal conduct is always compelled in so far as he does not resort to breaking up the existing social structure to fall short of his own nobler motives.
When conduct becomes determined by the tenants of such ideas, the inevitable results are ideological mentalities which disguise the real conditions of any mode of existence. The danger was not that the goals of any such idea were wrong, but that the use of such ethereal ideas to explain the practical realities of society led to wrong conclusions. We spoke earlier of Ideological distortions, and Mannheim, in pursuing the effects of this usage of the ethereal, lays out three specific situations of such distorted mentalities that result.
In the first, he lays out the situation whereby individuals, through such distorted thinking, are prevented from being able to attain an adequate awareness of the schism between their ideas about reality and reality itself. The totality of axioms, truisms and common knowledge serves the function of what Marx calls a false-consciousness. The second situation, the individual is capable of moving beyond this construction of ideology, is capable of seeing the dichotomy, but cannot act upon these glimpses out of some vital-emotional interest. It is incorrect to assume that emotion has no role in determining whether or not one addresses intellectually - such problems. This has to be viewed as especially true if the entire history of conduct of an individual or a society has been tied to the belief in such ideas. Once again the actual ways in which men thought, collectively and individually cannot be disregarded. Finally, Mannheim lays out the third classification whereby the mode of thinking is based on conscious deception. The mentalities in this classification are intentionally constructed to deceive. This form does not presuppose that the exponents or products of this mentality understand the true conception of reality, only that they understand that their own conception is false. In this last case we are forced to return to the psychology of interests to understand why this mentality might be assumed. In all of the above types however, a return to Mannheims views on the role of skepticism is ultimately helpful.
A final point regarding Mannheims study of Ideology to be discussed is the total and the particular forms of Ideology. The Particular conception of Ideology, can broadly be defined as the framework of knowledge of specific individuals. This conception of Ideology deals with specific tenets of individual or group thought, and not the overarching structure in which these ideas seem to be the constituent parts. It arises from the skepticism that ones opponents may have ideas which are . . .more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests. Engagement within this sphere raises the possibility that the components of individual thought might serve as functions of their very existence. It recalls the situation above regarding ideological distortion wherein an individual may be compelled to hold certain beliefs out of vital-emotional interests. Further, practical engagement in this sphere assumes that through discursive engagement, through a dialogue occurring within mutually agreed upon standards of objectivity and truthfulness, adversaries combating this particular form, can arrive at the truth of a situation. It addresses Ideology as contents of thought, and through the process of challenging these contents, the possibility is raised that one could clearly illustrate the flaws of certain views and certain beliefs. But even as important as correcting flawed assertions may be, Mannheim also cautioned further that, If we confine ourselves to the mental processes which take place in the individual and regard him as the only possible bearer of ideologies, we shall never grasp in its totality the structure of the intellectual world belonging to a social group in a given historical situation.
With the Total conception, by contrast, one deals precisely with this systemic mode of thought found in any given society (at any age). Mannheim points out that the individuals of any given society, due to their own distinct situation or position within that larger society, cannot ever be wholly constituent of these broad modes of thought; their lives occur from particular positions within any society and singularly comprise the collective oppositions which this larger totality firmly encompasses. Every individual participates only in fragments of this thought system, the totality of which is not in the least a mere sum of these fragmentary individual experiences. Instead, this conceptionthe Total conceptionrefers to the great ideas, the grand myths, the contextual framework of a society, through which individual ideas are viewed. The Total conception of Ideology deals with the modes of thought, not with its contents. It addresses the lens through which the actual contents are viewed. It is with this conception that one approaches an adversary with the possibility that their world-view might very well be merely the result of the conditions of existence they find surrounding themselves. While they may choose at that point to define their views as pragmatic, without addressing such a charge, most would be hard-pressed to continue to view their ideas of the world as objectively correct without further inquiry.
While Mannheim expresses the view that approaching Ideology from each conception has its own merit--the Total in that it addresses the possibility that the problems of our knowledge may lay in our overall outlook, the Particular in that perhaps the individual components of our thoughts themselves are flawed--the two, together, hold synergistic potential. Perhaps in challenging individuals on aspects of their own particular Ideological beliefs, ultimately one could begin to illustrate the need for a revisiting of the Total. While Mannheim seems to deal more with the particular and Marx the total, both are useful for understanding how Ideology works, and similarly, both approaches are key to addressing the problems which continue to face society its process of becoming.
Stepping away from text now, a few points are in order, I believe. One critique of Marx is as follows:
A) He held Ideologythe knowledge and beliefs that individuals acquired as a result of their social modes of material productionhad hitherto been intrinsically false due to its control by the ruling class.
B) Marx was simultaneously proposing a new mode of society in which the great majority of productive individuals held such power, but
C) He never attempted to discuss the same relational knowledge or beliefs which individuals would obtain through their social intercourse after such a change occurred and specifically address how they would be corrected.
As such, its hard to ascertain how this could be considered a complete view on the concept. While the German ideology was never published in its final form and remains an incomplete work by Marx, there were still opportunities for him to hint or to begin to flesh out this process. In the form that has been passed down, Marx simply asserts that Ideology is false and that once the ruling class is stripped of power by the proletariat (the workers), that Ideology will cease. Even if we accept Marxs definition of Ideology as strictly the ideas promulgated by the Capitalist class, then we are still left empty-handed concerning how the modes such a new society adopts will influence the thoughts, beliefs, and ideas of the individuals.
All we are left with is
(1) Marxs insinuation that it will not be false and
(2) the need for a new word that describes exactly the same processes that Ideology described previously.
For critiques of Capitalism (or other philosophers) Marx stands out as a sort of go-to guy. In the answering of questions on the nature of Ideology itself however, his contribution must yield to Mannheims.
Mannheims shortcomings appear somewhat parallel to his work on Ideology in his proposition for a scientific politics to counter-act Ideological distortion. His solution seems somewhat idealistic itself when he states that the knowledge of everything knowable becomes the obligation of the acting person. It is only then that Mannheim feels a Politics of Science can truly emerge. But contrasted against his own, somewhat less rigid materialist outlook, his professed desire to actively engage in the situations, as they exist, seems to fall short here and he begins to project into the future. Further, when this is weighed against his prior assertion that individual thought of a truly rational nature is the exception and not the norm (see: page 4) a dichotomy emerges. While this hardly constitutes a critical flaw, it is raised as a minor critique. Overall however, Mannheim delivers an exceptional case in his deliberation on Ideology. Ultimately, comparing the two works is almost unfair, as Marxs The German Ideology was essentially a critique of prevailing works of philosophy during his own time, and Mannheims text was written specifically to address the phenomenon itself. None the less, if Marxs text was the bedrock out of which Mannheims assertions grew, it is clearly Mannheim who advanced that foundation to a broader and deeper understanding out of which the study can develop further.
Since the time of Marx or Mannheim, new conceptions and definitions of Ideology as well as strategies for combating it have emerged. Where Marx saw the construction of a new form of society as the answer, and Mannheim, the construction of a new sciencethe Sociology of Knowledge--others such as Jacques Derrida have proposed methods requiring more precise modes of evaluation as an answer. Our present society certainly operates in particular modes of which Marx and Mannheim, due to their historical situation, did not address. Furthermore, there are certain questions which neither addressed in their own time, and as long as that is the case in any field of study, that topic will inevitably continue in its own process of becoming.
At the outset of Max Lerners Ideas are Weapons, published in 1991, the author relays the words of Professor Hermann Kantorowicz, an intellectual exile from Hitlers Germany who summed up his differentiation between thoughts and ideas: Men possess thoughts, but ideas possess men. Kantorowicz was speaking out of his own experiences. It hardly takes much imagination to consider the role that the dominant ideas of that time in Germany impacted the majority of individuals of that culture regarding their own conceptions of subjects such as justice, equality, fairness, patriotism and the role of individuals within a society. The importance of Ideology in any aspecttotal, particular, distorted, or wholly falsemay not appear to most as an important aspect in how they live their lives. For the most part Ideology is viewed as something that affects someone else; seldom do we consider our own conceptions as ideological. But even in our current situation where the blinding familiarity of the routine partisan struggles and in this situation where it seems the existence of relative point have view have devolved into the notion that there are relative truths as well, perhaps looking back into history may provide some sort of impetus. Whether it be the Germany of the 1930s and 40s, the American South up through the 1970s, situations abound, even outside of our own, where one can easily see how such ideas truly possess the individuals. Assuming that an individual saw no urgency in this endeavor, perhaps this realization of Ideological roles in history could motivate individuals to get a firmer understanding of what they consider their ideas today and to begin to realize its importance within their current situation.
-me, 10/20/03
-footnotes/endnotes-
Eagleton, Terry. Ideology: An Introduction. Pgs. 1-2
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.6
Ibid, p29. Several pages earlier, Mannheim prefaced this assertion by making the statement that Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather it is more correct to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him. He finds himself in an inherited situation (p.3) Such an assertion may not play to kindly to the beliefs of an individual who views himself solely as the product of their own choices and individual efforts, but when viewed against the backdrop of discussion to follow should be remembered.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.28
Mannheim refers to this as the fiction of the isolated and self-sufficient individual (p.28)
Ibid, p32
Speaking practically, the same events, interactions, etc., experienced from different position, teach individuals distinctly different things.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.31
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology, p. 52
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology, p. 52
or it became Muck depending on which ending the reader prefers. (Ibid, p.59)
Mannheim patterned his idea of the Rational and Irrational Spheres of socio-political conduct from the Austrian Albert Schffle who divided socio-political actions into the two camps of the routine state of affairs and politics. It was under the former that concepts like administration and usual business matters were conducted according to set rules and procedures. Judges, ruling on the case before them according to certain provisions clearly stated in applicable provisions of law were done so methodologically. As such, these matters were routine. Action did not fall into the realm of the Political until the resolution of competing interests were to be arrived at in a manner which was not already prescribed. It is in this latter situation where the importance of conduct emerges, especially in light of the fact that by its very nature, any such activity was occurring within a framework that was still open to resolution within an aspect of society that was still in the process of becoming. (see: Ideology and Utopia, p.112)
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p113-114.
And interestingly, that person no doubt was in a position to be told by someone else, who was told by someone else and so on ad nauseum all the while, an indeterminable number of generations have proceeded without any individual inquiry into the veracity of the claim.
Marxs view on the practicality of this realm can be clearly illustrated in his statement that philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same relation to one another as masturbation and sex. (The German Ideology, p.103) Extrapolation, in this case, is being left to the reader.
According to Marx, men must be in a position to live in order to be able to make history. But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. [The German Ideology, p.48] For Marx, it was through the manner in which these actions were collectively engaged in within a culture that individuals within that culture were able to form their ideas about the world.
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology, p.48
Ibid, p.47
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology, p. 47
It must be noted that Marx did see the division of labor as originating in an organic form within the family of certain periods of history where those members of the family who were better suited for the given tasks which sustain what he considered the fundamental level of society, the family, were allotted those tasks accordingly. However, the degree to which this specialization had advanced in his own time he seemed to view as problematic. In such an advance, individuals were turned into a form of organic machines capable only of reproducing this mode of life and in doing so were no longer able to engage in all the activities which truly made one human.
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology. p. 64
On p. 65 of The German Ideology, Marx also discusses the cleft within this ruling class between those who appear as the thinkers of this class: the intellectuals and ideologists, (arguably, the forerunners to todays talking heads and think tanks) who create the ideas and illusions of material life and those who are actively engaged in the process of controlling material production itself. He characterizes this as a further division of labor within this ruling class, and asserts that their attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive, because theyhave less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves. It is interesting to note that even in this context Marx views this process of activity itself, this being too busy, as a barrier to some form of reflection. If such activity amongst even those within this active component of the ruling class creates a condition which infringes upon such an individuals ability to rationally critique these modes of thought, how much more problematic must it be for those without any real control over the modes of their existence?
McLellan, David. Ideology, p. 9
It should be pointed out that The German Ideology was an unfinished manuscript written by Marx in 1846, and Mannheims views expressed in Ideology and Utopia came in 1929. Mannheims work appears to be deeply influenced by Marxist thought and even the contents of Marxs own writing. This period of 83 years should be understood and the fact that Mannheim slips the noose that snagged his predecessor (assuming one accepts the notion) should be viewed in context. Mannheim himself lays out at the beginning of Ideology and Utopia that man merely participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him. He finds himself in an inherited situation. Furthermore, in a later work, Systematic Sociology, Mannheim, critiquing Marxs Theory of Class Struggle, begins by emphasizing its value and shows a deep respect for the contributions of Marx.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p. 19: The most important role of thought in life consists, however, in providing guidance for conduct when decisions must be made. Every real decision (such as ones evaluations of other persons or how society should be organized) implies a judgement concerning good and evil, concerning the meaning of life and mind.
consensus used for lack of a better term.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p 94
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.95: The moral interpretation of ones own action is invalid, when, through the force of traditional modes of thought and conceptions of life, it does not allow for the accommodation of action and thought to a new and changed situation and in the end actually obscures and prevents this adjustment and transformation of man.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p.97
Ibid p.63
Ibid p.63 Also, earlier in the text on p. 35, Mannheim discusses in a rudimentary form the workings of this psychology. The merchant, the entrepreneur, the intellectual, each in his own way occupies a position which requires rational decisions concerning the tasks set by everyday life. In arriving at these decisions it is always necessary for the individual to free his judgments from those of others and to think through certain issues in a rational way from the point of view of his own interests.
While in Ideology and Utopia, the author never explicitly defines knowledge as a product of creation, he does define it as a product of society. And since he asserts that society itself is forever in the process of becoming, forever being re-created, re-made and redefined by the thoughts and actions of its constituents, by extension it logically follows that knowledge too is a creative process, ever-becoming. Perhaps after another 83 years have elapsed a new author will more fully address this.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p. 35-36
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.35
unless one looks at his track record. Marx seems to have taken on anyone at anytime in his career, never hesitating to illustrate why and how he felt theyre assertions were wrong.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p. 193
Ibid, p.194-195
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p.195
Ibid
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p. 55
Ibid, p.56
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.58
Ibid
McLellan, Ideology, p. 72
Works Cited:
Eagleton, Terry. Ideology: an introduction. London: Verso, 1991.
Lerner, Max. Ideas are Weapons. New Brunswick: Transaction, 1991.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia. 1929. Trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Sihls. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936.
Mannheim, Karl. Systematic Sociology. Ed. J. S. Eros and W.A.C. Stewart. New York: Grove, 1957.
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology. Ed. C. J. Arthur. New York: International Publishers, 1970.
McLellan, David. Ideology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995
The political and social world around us was not created, nor is it sustained, by innate reflex. It is the construction, the situation, the product of the actions of individuals. These actions, occurring within this social arena, and to a great extent, without, are shaped, to varying degrees, by some form of thought. In a general sense, action is just a response to individual and collective encounters with problems. Yet the specific actions and the individually specific definition or interpretation of the problem which precedes such actions - present an interesting question itself. Specifically, it calls forth the question of why the situation, why the object, why the problem is viewed in that specific way by the individual, and further, why the resultant action of the individual occurs in the specific ways that it does. If individuals across all divides, geo-cultural, historic-temporal, categorizations of class, race, agency/ability, etc., viewed situations and objects identically, this question would not exist. But it does. Values, events, concepts, etc., in short, life itself, seems to be open for interpretation. As such, a critical question emerges concerning the practicality, the merit, and even the very validity of an individuals perceptions with respect to the influence it has upon the actions of a distinctly intentioned individual within society. Author Terry Eagleton presents a definition of Ideology as the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world. It is in this context that I wish to approach the subject.
Within the political arena, labels abound. Labels like Conservative, Neo-liberal, Progressive, et al, suggest certain world-views, certain hierarchies of priority and arguably - to most individuals using them - even the value of the viewpoint expressed by an individual bearing such a label. Without attempting to prescribe our own judgments on the ideas represented by these labels in terms of the world-views they reflect, we can still take a look at how these views affect individuals. We can address the practical matter of how individuals whether they adopt such labels, or identify with aspects of the views they represent, come to understand their world. Perhaps in doing so, we will be able to move beyond the petty categorization and subsequent marginalization of differing forms or opposing modes of thought and advance the discourse of our current situation beyond the playground/primetime dichotomies of us vs. them.
Central to this discussion will be the texts of Karl Marxs The German Ideology and Karl Mannheims Ideology & Utopia. Both works deal specifically with the question of how individuals obtain the views which in turn impact their conduct within the social arena. Despite their differences, both share a fundamental assertion, namely, that ones world-view is not their own. Perhaps in the context of ownership, one could argue that it is; but in the context of authorship, such a view is viewed as wholly false. Individuals do not obtain their full understanding and knowledge of the world through their own means; Ideas, concepts, thoughts and beliefs are not obtained solely through some isolated and purely deductive or inductive method of reasoning that somehow arises through individual experience. To reinforce this last statement, it could be alluded that the probability that anyone reading this paper has ever clocked the speed of light inside a vacuum at 186,281 miles per second, proved that the earth is round one lazy summer, or taken some vacation time to verify that Plate Tectonics is the cause of earthquakes is virtually nil. However, few individuals inside the realm of group life would challenge these beliefs. If asked if these three statements were true, the majority of learned individuals would state that these assertions are, in fact, true. These assertions have become common truths; they are assumed by individuals to have been proven in the past, and have been incorporated into the collective of agreed-upon facts we all understand as rational Knowledge.
This brings to the discussion what Karl Mannheim views as the social character of knowledge. Knowledge has social roots. It is acquired by the individual through relationships with the natural and the social world, as well as through the individuals and the objects within it. According to Mannheim, knowledge is from the very beginning a co-operative process of group life, in which everyone unfolds his knowledge within the framework of a common fate, a common activity Individuals do not obtain their ideas solely from the data of their own experiences, they also learn from others. They learn through inference and through the juxtaposition with the external world. Mannheim held that during his time, the critical flaw of epistemology - the study of the nature of knowledge - was this belief that individuals were somehow self-sufficient in their capacity of obtaining a pure knowledge. It was wrong in Mannheims view to proceed along such lines of inquiry assuming that the individual produced his knowledge of the world from within himself alone, Furthermore, he argued, these very experiences (from which this fictitiously self-sufficient individual obtains such data) themselves are not individually controlled by the subject seeking this objective world-view. Nor could it be argued that the social actor proceeds from a definitively neutral station somehow devoid of beliefs or ideas either wholly created or influenced by others. Even the contexts and situational dynamics of the experiences, especially within the political and social arena, are largely created and influenced not only by surrounding actors but by preceding generations of actors, by those who came before. The argument that the knowledge which an individual possesses is a collection of their own creation is fundamentally flawed.
Mannheim even pointed out that if one believed that the opposite was true in their particular* case, they would still be hard-pressed to believe that somehow all other actors, all other members of society, were similarly engaged in the construction of their own world-views and that somehow it is through a form of discourse or dialogue, based upon the collective rationality of all individuals, whereby society arrived at a similarly rational and correct idea of how the world should be viewed. Such individual thought for Mannheim, was the rare exception, not the rule. Collective thoughtcollective rational thought--would be just that much rarer still. Individuals obtained their ideas, their views, the totality of their knowledge in some other way. Mannheim felt they learned, instead, directly through their interactions with others, through the society in which they find themselves and the resources and objects within that society, and more specifically from within their position in that society. For him, Knowing is fundamentally collective knowing The largest part of thought is erected upon a basis of collective actions It was this understanding that provided the impetus for attempting to understand the influence of the collective unconscious, the group mind, or the predominant/prevailing ideas of reality and their effect on the ideas possessed by the individual. Once the faade of the individuals authorship of their own ideas is stripped away, the importance of understanding the framework of ideas surrounding the individual finally emerges. When this understanding is applied to the social and political actions of individuals, the question of the genesis of this frameworkthe beliefs and views adopted by the individual--raises certain questions regarding both practical conduct within the social sphere and individual responsibility in the propagation of support of any unexamined framework or the of which it is composed within the discursive or rhetorical sphere.
Marx, too, placed great emphasis on the social nature of thought. Consciousness, for Marx was nothing but the consciousness of existing practice. Consciousness exists within a social matrix, and as such retains a social character at all times. For an individual at some stage to imagine that they would or could separate themselves from this matrix to operate with the realm of ideals and arrive at something real, was utterly incorrect for Marx. It is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own Once consciousness was viewed as anything other than the awareness of the current situation, once it became the point of genesis regarding concepts, ideals, mores, or served in and of itself as the primary means of justifying social conditions it assumed a role which it was no longer adequately suited to fulfill. Marx was speaking directly to the role which consciousness played in the existing practices of the division of labor at the time, but this illustrates a critical point that should be understood by anyone not familiar with the work of Marx. His was not a philosophical discussion of Ideology, knowledge, consciousness or whatever other term one wishes to ascribe, in and of itself. Marx nearly always tied any concept back to his primary interest regarding the situations surrounding the practical existence of individuals. There was no inquiry into ancillary subjects solely for the purpose of understanding the subject in abstract manners; it was only in understanding the ways in which the subject affected material life that the pursuit held any usefulness for Marx. For this reason it is extremely difficult to discuss Marxs views on Ideology in the text, as such, without discussing the larger body of social analysis found within. Mannheim, by contrast, maintained a more focused approach on the subject, or from a more Marxist position, a more isolated study of Ideology a few degrees apart from the material. Building on the thoughts of those that came before him, Mannheim considered all social activity (and of course, political conduct is a division of within this larger category) to occur within two distinct, yet connected, spheres: The Rational and the Irrational. It is important however, to note the context in which Mannheim uses these adjectives. Every social process may be divided into a rationalized sphere consisting of settled and routinized procedures in dealing with situations that recur in an orderly fashion, and the irrational by which it is surrounded. For him, the recurring and clearly defined structures within societylaw, protocol, standardized etiquette, rules of order--constitute the rational; all the political and social activity surrounding itdebate, revolution, the tackling of new problems outside of previously formalized methodsthis was the playground of the irrational. But even as this rational sphere, the law for example, is obviously the product of some historical process, to view it as the end-result of historical attempts to address problematic issues is also false. It is not the end result of anything. Political mechanisms, social structures, civilization itself are in a constant state of flux. They are always in the process of becoming; always changing. The structures of the rational ultimately occur within the framework of the irrational and are subject to its influence in this temporal process. To continue the example of lawoccurring in the formalized or rational sphere--one has only to look back within our own recent history to see how laws addressing issues of, say, racial equality were both established, re-enforced, challenged and changed through the irrationalthat is, the non-formalized, subjectivespheres of action based upon things such as self-interest, tradition and ideas of justice. Revisiting the question of individual authorship of their own ideas, specifically to the concept of knowledge, if one knows today that Plate Tectonics causes earthquakes, essentially, because they found themselves in a position in which someone told them so , why should similar individuals in 1950s Alabama doubt that blacks were inferior by nature and should be prohibited from holding the same rights as whites? After all, thats what they were told. That is what they knew. Their knowledge had roots which were not rationally obtained. Perhaps not all irrationally obtained knowledge results in such problematic situations, but it is easy to see through just this example how irrational knowledge or irrational ideologies create unjust situations at a substantial cost to the lives of individuals. And if this particular failure of knowledge which still manifests itself today, why would it be so hard to believe that similar ideologies surrounding us every day, creating their own tenets of knowledge, are coming to us at a similarly devastating cost?
Karl Marx had more than a few thoughts on how this concept of Ideology worked. He was extremely critical of the notions espoused up to and during his time that the ideas of any given generation somehow emerged as a product of pure thought. For Marx, individual consciousness was the result of concrete material situations surrounding the individual. (Either temporally or spatially to use one of Mannheims caveats) According to Marx, men must be in a position to live in order to be able to make history. But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. For Marx, it was through the manner in which these actions were collectively engaged in that individuals within that culture were able to form their ideas about the world, and practically how they should act within it. The realm of pure thought, to borrow a phrase from Marx, was grossly subordinate to the realm of practical existence in the construction of beliefs and ideas. Trading in the terms thought for consciousness we can see the first hint at this in his assertion that, Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process.
Put bluntly, what one did, how one ate, and where one slept, had a large impact on where one stood in the realm of ideas. How individuals managed to survive, how they managed to take care of the essential tasks of life, of existence, these were the processes by which their ideas were formed, not the other way around. Individuals have never collectively conceived of how society ought to be prior to their introduction to it and then set about the task of building just such a society. Instead, the ideas which came to them regarding how society ought to be were instead reactions to the modes of life that they themselves encountered. Individuals, in developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.
One of the more interesting themes throughout Marxs writings is his constant allusion to the fragmentation of society. He speaks of the division of labor which en masse turns mankind from what was historically a collection of self-sufficient creatures into a collective of increasingly specialized individuals no longer able to obtain for themselves that which is essential for their survival outside of society. Such dependence ties individuals not only to society itself but to the specific modes of conduct and at a deeper level, of thought, in which that society operates. This dependence, according to Marx, assumes the form of fetters, of chains. Furthermore, as a product of this specialization, of this division of labor, of resources, of influence, the interests of differing elements within society become fragmented. And so long as the actions of all individuals are determined by these dominant, yet materially-oblivious ideas concerning conduct, this broader ideology serves to enslave the individual. The very constituent parts of society, the family, the individuals, are bound to encounter problematic situations and begin to obtain myopic views or at least contradictory ideas of what is important, at a very real, material level when contrasted against the dominant interests of such a society as a whole. Theft, for example, may bring about anathema within such an advanced society. But contrasted against the need for bread by those who no longer have the means of acquiring it within the modes prescribed by that society, inside that situation, the material struggle for existence once again emerges as the precursor for the ideas of individual conduct. Some form of action is the inevitable result. Given the opportunity, in whatever form it takes, truly hungry people will not stay hungry for long. If one sleeps in the poor house, they may have opposing views from those who sleep elsewhere on how the resources of that society are allocated. Marxs critical assertion was that these ideas do not emerge within the realm of pure thought. They come before.
It is important to illustrate here that when Marx speaks of the dominant modes of thought or Ideologies of a given period and its influence upon the ideas adopted by individuals within that historical moment, Marx was not claiming that individual action or thought had an inevitable or predetermined situation-specific outcome. Indeed, this is implicit when he speaks of contradictions between the interests of society and individuals. Moments of crises, situations of material urgency created a tension between the prevailing Ideologies and the individuals engaging in thought or the subsequent activity of overcoming such problems. Instead, Marx was addressing how amidst the daily status quo, amidst the blindingly familiar processes by which individuals sustain their existence and in the absence of material crisis, the dominant modes of thought were the creation of those who held control of the material production of society.
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it..
Like all other ideas, these ruling ideas also came after the fact; they came from those who already ruled. These ideas expressed their interests, were formulated through their perspective. Afterwards, this totality of ideas was adopted by those members of society who did not influence such control. Further, the integration and adoption of such Ideas came not by consensus, not through discourse, not by way of philosophical inquiry, but rather through the daily practices required for existence which were controlled by this ruling class. It was this key principle which differentiates Marx from Mannheim on a certain level: For Mannheim, the framework of dominant thought was a societal construct that emerged from relational experience. For Marx, Ideology was a product created by a specific component of society, namely the ruling class. One allowed for the interplay of opposing forces in the construction of this dominant mode of thinking, the other held that Ideology was predicated upon false conceptions created and sustained by those controlling the material existence of society.
This is where Mannheim slips the noose that seems to snag Marx. In David McClellans Ideology, the assertion is that, for Marx, ideas became ideological when they were used to cover up the reality of situations, especially those situations concerning economic or social distribution of resources and when these ideas also served to justify this inequality. Ideology is based, surprisingly enough, on ideas or idealism. For Marx, views should be based on the real circumstances affecting individuals, materialism. In this separation of materialism and idealism as the basic paradigm of dominant thought, Marx felt that all Ideology served the purpose of an illusion serving to hide the real processes by which individuals should address the uneven distributions of resources within society. By extension, (and this is not McLellan nor is it directly quotable Marx) once these illusions were destroyed, Ideology itself would be destroyed and the truth of the current situation emerges. Ideology is intrinsically false for Marx. Hence we have an interesting hypothetical where once a situation occurs whereby the dominant thought of the day proceeds along a course which parallels Marxs own conception of how things should be, namely, that the ruling class no longer holds sway over mankinds thoughts and actions, the structure of ideas which emerge out of that reality are no longer Ideological despite the fact that individuals are certain to still be influenced by this new society and by the ideas surrounding the intercourse that emerges as a result of social activity within it. The influence of society remains the same in method, if not in message. This presents a problem for Marxs conception of Ideology. Marxs interest in the subject of Ideology seemed to be its role in the domination of the producing class of society, by those who held the means of material production.
Returning now to Mannheim, the purpose of understanding Ideology as such, as well as how it operated, was of importance to him not so much out of an ends-based motive, but so that thought may be adequately used in this collective process of existence. In as much as knowledge is in a sense is only those facts which are socially agreed upon, it was of fundamental importance that individuals understand the forces which were at play in the construction of this consensus. Whereas Marx addressed Ideology as ultimately false, Mannheim instead addressed falsities within this realm as ideological distortion. This allowed Mannheim to deal with the same forces which Marx attempted to call out, while still allowing for the concept of ideology to exist should all such distortions somehow be corrected. Ideological distortion and the subsequent false consciousness which it creates were of particular danger when, it obstructs comprehension of a reality which is the outcome of constant reorganization of the mental processes which make up our worlds It is necessary to concentrate our attention with greater intensity upon the task of determining which of all the ideas current are really valid in a given situation. According to Mannheim, individuals must be able to rationally access the concrete and ever-changing moment in order to ethically determine their conduct within society. He points out several instances where dogmatic notions of ethical practice based upon the traditionally dominant modes of social thinking, once applied to new and changed circumstances, cannot be automatically justified in such an application. If the ideas of conduct within a society are based upon the traditions of that society, then by the very nature that any society occurs in the context of becoming--that is, any society occurs as a sequence of moments or historical situations that are ever-changing--then what are these standards of behavior, if not Ideological, and how real, how practical are they in determining the ethical conduct of the individual in the current situation? It was through critical inquiries such as this that Mannheim sought not just to look for common place errors in rational thought, but instead to turn the inquiry to distorted mental structures themselves.
To this end, skepticism played a crucial role for Mannheim. One of the chief characteristics of the method of rational analysis of human behaviour was the presupposition that men were given to feigning and to deceiving their fellows. Even within narrow spheres of social life, within a neighborhood for example, the individuals within even that limited setting bring differing approaches towards their interpretations of any given experience, These approaches are based on their own histories, their previous experiences, their individual situation, position, et al. In the purely rational sphere the problem of understanding as it relates to the social concept of knowledge may boil down to the problem of interpretation. But in the irrational sphere of everyday life, this process of converting experience into socialized knowledge is influenced by actors who have definite interests. It is through this recognition of what Mannheim terms the psychology of interests which must have at its core a sense of skepticism, that individuals are able to discern for themselves, to the extent possible, the factual basis of the knowledge being created . It was through this awareness, using rationality coupled with skepticism, that Mannheim felt society could attempt to correct the ideologically distorted knowledge of a given era and best judge situations and conduct themselves accordingly.
One of the problems with this happening however, seemed to be the ways in which society itself was organized. Similar to Marx, Mannheim had real problems with the structure of society during his time. He illustrates his own thoughts on the division of labor and the resulting problems of perspective thus:
A society which in its division of labor and functional differentiation cannot offer to each individual a set of problems and fields of operation in which full initiative and individual judgment can be exercised, also cannot realize a thoroughgoing individualistic and rationalistic Weltanschauung which can aspire to become an effective social reality.
The same social modes of operation that Marx spoke of presented their own problems for Mannheim. For Mannheim the primacy wasnt so much a situation in which he seemed ultimately concerned for the plight of the common laborer who, according to Marx, suffered in an exploitative relationship, as much as it was the impact which such division held in this ongoing process of becoming. This division, which was only a particular aspect of the manner in which his society operated, did create a very real situation in which personal initiative and ability were stifled. In the very mechanical manners in which individuals handled their professional or productive lives, performing set tasks in just such a way, they were not actively engaged in matters which prepared them for the critical activity required of such individuals for the construction of an effective social reality. They simply had to do what they were told, Mannheim seems to argue, and as such the implication is that they were being somehow conditioned to accept things as they were given. Such a situation hardly lived up to his perception of the potential of life in a post-Enlightenment world. Even though Marx himself took serious exception to the assertions which came from the period of the Enlightenment it is not much of a stretch to imagine that he might agree with Mannheim on this point.
Marx and Mannheim had quite a bit in common. This approach to the analysis of concrete modes of existence, the division of labor referenced above for example, is just one common thread. It was only with this attention to the material, always keeping one foot in the gutter, with an eye on the objective reality of the current situations which compose individuals lives that one could effectively address or combat these ideas. It was incumbent in such an endeavor to, quite literally, keep it real. Attempting to formulate Ideas concerning individual existence through pure philosophy, outside the realm of the material, was of little interest or use for Mannheim. In fact, there was no such thing as existence as such beyond philosophical rhetoric which held minimal benefit in understanding the concrete forms society, as it actually existed. Individual existence was always a concrete historical form of social existence. It was always a particular type of existence. Mannheim was clear to illustrate how some of the ideas within society, especially those which had such mentally constructed origins, transcended the actual order through which society functioned. That is, certain ideas simply did not fit, functionally, within the actual structure of society which espoused them. The projection of their content was impossible without destroying the structures of the society itself.
The idea of Christian brotherly love, for instance, in a society founded on serfdom remains an unrealizable and, in this sense, ideological idea, even when the intended meaning is, in good faith, a motive in the conduct of the individual. To live consistently, in the light of Christian brotherly love, in a society which is not organized on the same principle is impossible. The individual in his personal conduct is always compelled in so far as he does not resort to breaking up the existing social structure to fall short of his own nobler motives.
When conduct becomes determined by the tenants of such ideas, the inevitable results are ideological mentalities which disguise the real conditions of any mode of existence. The danger was not that the goals of any such idea were wrong, but that the use of such ethereal ideas to explain the practical realities of society led to wrong conclusions. We spoke earlier of Ideological distortions, and Mannheim, in pursuing the effects of this usage of the ethereal, lays out three specific situations of such distorted mentalities that result.
In the first, he lays out the situation whereby individuals, through such distorted thinking, are prevented from being able to attain an adequate awareness of the schism between their ideas about reality and reality itself. The totality of axioms, truisms and common knowledge serves the function of what Marx calls a false-consciousness. The second situation, the individual is capable of moving beyond this construction of ideology, is capable of seeing the dichotomy, but cannot act upon these glimpses out of some vital-emotional interest. It is incorrect to assume that emotion has no role in determining whether or not one addresses intellectually - such problems. This has to be viewed as especially true if the entire history of conduct of an individual or a society has been tied to the belief in such ideas. Once again the actual ways in which men thought, collectively and individually cannot be disregarded. Finally, Mannheim lays out the third classification whereby the mode of thinking is based on conscious deception. The mentalities in this classification are intentionally constructed to deceive. This form does not presuppose that the exponents or products of this mentality understand the true conception of reality, only that they understand that their own conception is false. In this last case we are forced to return to the psychology of interests to understand why this mentality might be assumed. In all of the above types however, a return to Mannheims views on the role of skepticism is ultimately helpful.
A final point regarding Mannheims study of Ideology to be discussed is the total and the particular forms of Ideology. The Particular conception of Ideology, can broadly be defined as the framework of knowledge of specific individuals. This conception of Ideology deals with specific tenets of individual or group thought, and not the overarching structure in which these ideas seem to be the constituent parts. It arises from the skepticism that ones opponents may have ideas which are . . .more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests. Engagement within this sphere raises the possibility that the components of individual thought might serve as functions of their very existence. It recalls the situation above regarding ideological distortion wherein an individual may be compelled to hold certain beliefs out of vital-emotional interests. Further, practical engagement in this sphere assumes that through discursive engagement, through a dialogue occurring within mutually agreed upon standards of objectivity and truthfulness, adversaries combating this particular form, can arrive at the truth of a situation. It addresses Ideology as contents of thought, and through the process of challenging these contents, the possibility is raised that one could clearly illustrate the flaws of certain views and certain beliefs. But even as important as correcting flawed assertions may be, Mannheim also cautioned further that, If we confine ourselves to the mental processes which take place in the individual and regard him as the only possible bearer of ideologies, we shall never grasp in its totality the structure of the intellectual world belonging to a social group in a given historical situation.
With the Total conception, by contrast, one deals precisely with this systemic mode of thought found in any given society (at any age). Mannheim points out that the individuals of any given society, due to their own distinct situation or position within that larger society, cannot ever be wholly constituent of these broad modes of thought; their lives occur from particular positions within any society and singularly comprise the collective oppositions which this larger totality firmly encompasses. Every individual participates only in fragments of this thought system, the totality of which is not in the least a mere sum of these fragmentary individual experiences. Instead, this conceptionthe Total conceptionrefers to the great ideas, the grand myths, the contextual framework of a society, through which individual ideas are viewed. The Total conception of Ideology deals with the modes of thought, not with its contents. It addresses the lens through which the actual contents are viewed. It is with this conception that one approaches an adversary with the possibility that their world-view might very well be merely the result of the conditions of existence they find surrounding themselves. While they may choose at that point to define their views as pragmatic, without addressing such a charge, most would be hard-pressed to continue to view their ideas of the world as objectively correct without further inquiry.
While Mannheim expresses the view that approaching Ideology from each conception has its own merit--the Total in that it addresses the possibility that the problems of our knowledge may lay in our overall outlook, the Particular in that perhaps the individual components of our thoughts themselves are flawed--the two, together, hold synergistic potential. Perhaps in challenging individuals on aspects of their own particular Ideological beliefs, ultimately one could begin to illustrate the need for a revisiting of the Total. While Mannheim seems to deal more with the particular and Marx the total, both are useful for understanding how Ideology works, and similarly, both approaches are key to addressing the problems which continue to face society its process of becoming.
Stepping away from text now, a few points are in order, I believe. One critique of Marx is as follows:
A) He held Ideologythe knowledge and beliefs that individuals acquired as a result of their social modes of material productionhad hitherto been intrinsically false due to its control by the ruling class.
B) Marx was simultaneously proposing a new mode of society in which the great majority of productive individuals held such power, but
C) He never attempted to discuss the same relational knowledge or beliefs which individuals would obtain through their social intercourse after such a change occurred and specifically address how they would be corrected.
As such, its hard to ascertain how this could be considered a complete view on the concept. While the German ideology was never published in its final form and remains an incomplete work by Marx, there were still opportunities for him to hint or to begin to flesh out this process. In the form that has been passed down, Marx simply asserts that Ideology is false and that once the ruling class is stripped of power by the proletariat (the workers), that Ideology will cease. Even if we accept Marxs definition of Ideology as strictly the ideas promulgated by the Capitalist class, then we are still left empty-handed concerning how the modes such a new society adopts will influence the thoughts, beliefs, and ideas of the individuals.
All we are left with is
(1) Marxs insinuation that it will not be false and
(2) the need for a new word that describes exactly the same processes that Ideology described previously.
For critiques of Capitalism (or other philosophers) Marx stands out as a sort of go-to guy. In the answering of questions on the nature of Ideology itself however, his contribution must yield to Mannheims.
Mannheims shortcomings appear somewhat parallel to his work on Ideology in his proposition for a scientific politics to counter-act Ideological distortion. His solution seems somewhat idealistic itself when he states that the knowledge of everything knowable becomes the obligation of the acting person. It is only then that Mannheim feels a Politics of Science can truly emerge. But contrasted against his own, somewhat less rigid materialist outlook, his professed desire to actively engage in the situations, as they exist, seems to fall short here and he begins to project into the future. Further, when this is weighed against his prior assertion that individual thought of a truly rational nature is the exception and not the norm (see: page 4) a dichotomy emerges. While this hardly constitutes a critical flaw, it is raised as a minor critique. Overall however, Mannheim delivers an exceptional case in his deliberation on Ideology. Ultimately, comparing the two works is almost unfair, as Marxs The German Ideology was essentially a critique of prevailing works of philosophy during his own time, and Mannheims text was written specifically to address the phenomenon itself. None the less, if Marxs text was the bedrock out of which Mannheims assertions grew, it is clearly Mannheim who advanced that foundation to a broader and deeper understanding out of which the study can develop further.
Since the time of Marx or Mannheim, new conceptions and definitions of Ideology as well as strategies for combating it have emerged. Where Marx saw the construction of a new form of society as the answer, and Mannheim, the construction of a new sciencethe Sociology of Knowledge--others such as Jacques Derrida have proposed methods requiring more precise modes of evaluation as an answer. Our present society certainly operates in particular modes of which Marx and Mannheim, due to their historical situation, did not address. Furthermore, there are certain questions which neither addressed in their own time, and as long as that is the case in any field of study, that topic will inevitably continue in its own process of becoming.
At the outset of Max Lerners Ideas are Weapons, published in 1991, the author relays the words of Professor Hermann Kantorowicz, an intellectual exile from Hitlers Germany who summed up his differentiation between thoughts and ideas: Men possess thoughts, but ideas possess men. Kantorowicz was speaking out of his own experiences. It hardly takes much imagination to consider the role that the dominant ideas of that time in Germany impacted the majority of individuals of that culture regarding their own conceptions of subjects such as justice, equality, fairness, patriotism and the role of individuals within a society. The importance of Ideology in any aspecttotal, particular, distorted, or wholly falsemay not appear to most as an important aspect in how they live their lives. For the most part Ideology is viewed as something that affects someone else; seldom do we consider our own conceptions as ideological. But even in our current situation where the blinding familiarity of the routine partisan struggles and in this situation where it seems the existence of relative point have view have devolved into the notion that there are relative truths as well, perhaps looking back into history may provide some sort of impetus. Whether it be the Germany of the 1930s and 40s, the American South up through the 1970s, situations abound, even outside of our own, where one can easily see how such ideas truly possess the individuals. Assuming that an individual saw no urgency in this endeavor, perhaps this realization of Ideological roles in history could motivate individuals to get a firmer understanding of what they consider their ideas today and to begin to realize its importance within their current situation.
-me, 10/20/03
-footnotes/endnotes-
Eagleton, Terry. Ideology: An Introduction. Pgs. 1-2
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.6
Ibid, p29. Several pages earlier, Mannheim prefaced this assertion by making the statement that Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather it is more correct to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him. He finds himself in an inherited situation (p.3) Such an assertion may not play to kindly to the beliefs of an individual who views himself solely as the product of their own choices and individual efforts, but when viewed against the backdrop of discussion to follow should be remembered.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.28
Mannheim refers to this as the fiction of the isolated and self-sufficient individual (p.28)
Ibid, p32
Speaking practically, the same events, interactions, etc., experienced from different position, teach individuals distinctly different things.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.31
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology, p. 52
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology, p. 52
or it became Muck depending on which ending the reader prefers. (Ibid, p.59)
Mannheim patterned his idea of the Rational and Irrational Spheres of socio-political conduct from the Austrian Albert Schffle who divided socio-political actions into the two camps of the routine state of affairs and politics. It was under the former that concepts like administration and usual business matters were conducted according to set rules and procedures. Judges, ruling on the case before them according to certain provisions clearly stated in applicable provisions of law were done so methodologically. As such, these matters were routine. Action did not fall into the realm of the Political until the resolution of competing interests were to be arrived at in a manner which was not already prescribed. It is in this latter situation where the importance of conduct emerges, especially in light of the fact that by its very nature, any such activity was occurring within a framework that was still open to resolution within an aspect of society that was still in the process of becoming. (see: Ideology and Utopia, p.112)
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p113-114.
And interestingly, that person no doubt was in a position to be told by someone else, who was told by someone else and so on ad nauseum all the while, an indeterminable number of generations have proceeded without any individual inquiry into the veracity of the claim.
Marxs view on the practicality of this realm can be clearly illustrated in his statement that philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same relation to one another as masturbation and sex. (The German Ideology, p.103) Extrapolation, in this case, is being left to the reader.
According to Marx, men must be in a position to live in order to be able to make history. But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. [The German Ideology, p.48] For Marx, it was through the manner in which these actions were collectively engaged in within a culture that individuals within that culture were able to form their ideas about the world.
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology, p.48
Ibid, p.47
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology, p. 47
It must be noted that Marx did see the division of labor as originating in an organic form within the family of certain periods of history where those members of the family who were better suited for the given tasks which sustain what he considered the fundamental level of society, the family, were allotted those tasks accordingly. However, the degree to which this specialization had advanced in his own time he seemed to view as problematic. In such an advance, individuals were turned into a form of organic machines capable only of reproducing this mode of life and in doing so were no longer able to engage in all the activities which truly made one human.
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology. p. 64
On p. 65 of The German Ideology, Marx also discusses the cleft within this ruling class between those who appear as the thinkers of this class: the intellectuals and ideologists, (arguably, the forerunners to todays talking heads and think tanks) who create the ideas and illusions of material life and those who are actively engaged in the process of controlling material production itself. He characterizes this as a further division of labor within this ruling class, and asserts that their attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive, because theyhave less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves. It is interesting to note that even in this context Marx views this process of activity itself, this being too busy, as a barrier to some form of reflection. If such activity amongst even those within this active component of the ruling class creates a condition which infringes upon such an individuals ability to rationally critique these modes of thought, how much more problematic must it be for those without any real control over the modes of their existence?
McLellan, David. Ideology, p. 9
It should be pointed out that The German Ideology was an unfinished manuscript written by Marx in 1846, and Mannheims views expressed in Ideology and Utopia came in 1929. Mannheims work appears to be deeply influenced by Marxist thought and even the contents of Marxs own writing. This period of 83 years should be understood and the fact that Mannheim slips the noose that snagged his predecessor (assuming one accepts the notion) should be viewed in context. Mannheim himself lays out at the beginning of Ideology and Utopia that man merely participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him. He finds himself in an inherited situation. Furthermore, in a later work, Systematic Sociology, Mannheim, critiquing Marxs Theory of Class Struggle, begins by emphasizing its value and shows a deep respect for the contributions of Marx.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p. 19: The most important role of thought in life consists, however, in providing guidance for conduct when decisions must be made. Every real decision (such as ones evaluations of other persons or how society should be organized) implies a judgement concerning good and evil, concerning the meaning of life and mind.
consensus used for lack of a better term.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p 94
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.95: The moral interpretation of ones own action is invalid, when, through the force of traditional modes of thought and conceptions of life, it does not allow for the accommodation of action and thought to a new and changed situation and in the end actually obscures and prevents this adjustment and transformation of man.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p.97
Ibid p.63
Ibid p.63 Also, earlier in the text on p. 35, Mannheim discusses in a rudimentary form the workings of this psychology. The merchant, the entrepreneur, the intellectual, each in his own way occupies a position which requires rational decisions concerning the tasks set by everyday life. In arriving at these decisions it is always necessary for the individual to free his judgments from those of others and to think through certain issues in a rational way from the point of view of his own interests.
While in Ideology and Utopia, the author never explicitly defines knowledge as a product of creation, he does define it as a product of society. And since he asserts that society itself is forever in the process of becoming, forever being re-created, re-made and redefined by the thoughts and actions of its constituents, by extension it logically follows that knowledge too is a creative process, ever-becoming. Perhaps after another 83 years have elapsed a new author will more fully address this.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p. 35-36
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.35
unless one looks at his track record. Marx seems to have taken on anyone at anytime in his career, never hesitating to illustrate why and how he felt theyre assertions were wrong.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p. 193
Ibid, p.194-195
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p.195
Ibid
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, p. 55
Ibid, p.56
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia, p.58
Ibid
McLellan, Ideology, p. 72
Works Cited:
Eagleton, Terry. Ideology: an introduction. London: Verso, 1991.
Lerner, Max. Ideas are Weapons. New Brunswick: Transaction, 1991.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology & Utopia. 1929. Trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Sihls. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936.
Mannheim, Karl. Systematic Sociology. Ed. J. S. Eros and W.A.C. Stewart. New York: Grove, 1957.
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology. Ed. C. J. Arthur. New York: International Publishers, 1970.
McLellan, David. Ideology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995
kurtz:
i knew there was a reason i liked you. i give it an A. i was too drunk to actually read through it. i will give my true opinion tomorrow............. damn, i'm a bore..............