Chapter One
Introduction
Advances in science and technology lend immediacy to metaphysical and ethical questions which have long appeared abstract and hypothetical. Questions about the specific identity, and ethical permissibility, of creating geep (goat/sheep chimera), quail-chicks and humanzees were once limited to science fiction but now fall squarely into the domain of applied philosophy. We have either already created these creatures or will very likely, in the case of the humanzee , be able to do so in the near future. There is, then, an urgent need for a consistent body of law to govern the creation of chimeras.
Not being a work of law, this paper does not attempt to specify the content of such legislation but aims, rather, to aid others in doing so by giving clear answers to two important questions. The first question is: what counts as a chimera? In answer to this we will define specific identity in terms of functional arrangement and then examine which interventions inherently change said arrangement. The second question is: can a good argument against be made, from the point of view of chimera welfare, against the creation of some or all chimera? In answer to this it will be argued that the creation of some chimera runs contrary to our moral obligations to a) previously existing creatures and b) those creatures we wish to design and create. It is suggested that the content of these obligations form the core of the aforementioned laws, though the strength of these obligations against other moral considerations is here left to the interpretation of the reader.
Chapter 2
Defining Chimeras
Confusion dogs description of the chimera in Greek mythology. Everyone agrees it was a fire-breathing creature, part lion, part goat, part dragon, killed by the hero Bellerephon whilst riding Pegasus . Consensus breaks down, though, on whether the chimera had the heads of three different species or was, as Homer says, in the fore part a lion, in the hinder a serpent, and in the middle a goat . This dissonance is mirrored, as Greely notes , by the variety of definitions for the chimera in modern science. By combining an explanation of specific identity (identity with a kind of type) with a critique of contemporary definitions of chimera, this chapter will attempt to shed some light on the issue and advance an alternative definition of chimera.
What, in general, determines the specific identity of material objects? Three candidates are: first, what something is made of (composition), second, the set of parts it has (constitution) and third, how its parts are arranged (organising principle) . Arrangement is taken here to mean, beyond its common spatial sense, the functional relations of parts to each other and to that surrounding them which, for organisms, is their environment.
Composition will have to be discarded, because for any kind (e.g. tables) individual instances of that kind can be made from a variety of different materials (e.g. plastic, wood, metal).
Initially it seems that constitution must also be discarded, due to its failure to distinguish between things with identical, yet differently arranged, parts. When an identical number of identical bricks are used, in one case to make a church, and in another to make an air raid shelter, constitution fails to see that the buildings belong to separate kinds.
For species, however, constitution may be saved if we determine specific identity, not by a set of parts, but rather by one single part which, in the case of mammals, might be the brain. We obviously do not mean that species identity is determined by simply having a brain, but rather by having a particular type of brain. In this sense something with one type of brain is a human, something with another type of brain is a cat, while something with yet another type of brain is a dog. The question then arises as to what makes a particular brain the type of brain it is. To say that, for instance, it is a human brain because it is the sort of brain possessed by humans will create an irresolvable circularity in which type of brain both determines species and is itself determined by species . We are forced, once again, to choose between composition, constitution and organising principle. Composition and constitution (sets), as we have already seen, will not do, while single part constitution theory just leads us to ask of that single part of the brain, what determines its specific identity and so on, ad infinitum, for the part of the part of the part. Organising principle is the only suitable candidate left but, if it can determine the specific identity of a part, why cant it determine the specific identity of the whole? This possibility is made even more attractive because single part constitution theory is incapable of determining the specific identity of material objects. It seems quite impossible, for example, to name one part common to all tables.
Organising principle theory provides as good an answer for tables as it does for species and, unlike constitution (of sets), also manages to distinguish between the church and the air raid shelter. Furthermore, organising principle theory allows us to say that those individuals missing any particular part(s) (e.g. those without legs) or who possess a part(s) but without its/their normal function(s) (e.g. those whose kidneys dont work) are still members, albeit deficient members , of our species so long as that which is not missing or malfunctioning is arranged in accordance with the relevant organising principle.
An important distinction must be made between the one overriding organising principle and potentially numerous subsidiary organising principles. Take the human body in which the nucleus of a cell, insofar as it determines the arrangement of the cells parts, is an organising principle. This is merely a subsidiary organising principle because its arrangement, and that which it gives to other parts of the cell, is derived from a higher organising principle. The human body has a pyramid of subsidiary organising principles and it is tempting to think that the brain sits at the top as the overriding organising principle. This cannot be the case, however, for our knowledge of embryology shows that arrangement of parts is determined prior to brain formation.
The overriding organising principle is not identical with one dominant part but is, in a non-platonic sense, the form involved, i.e. the chairness of the chair, the humanness of the human being and so on. Where does this form come from though? Regarding chairs we can point to an idea shared by chair designers but what about particular species? Religious explanations aside, a tempting answer is genetic structure, or more specifically DNA, but this assumes there is some set of DNA shared exclusively by members of a species. Current studies indicate otherwise, for though the Human Genome Projects standard human genome is meant to be 99.9% identical to each individual human genome (RBp4), there is no 99.9% of any individuals DNA that is shared exclusively with members of her species. One solution to the problem might be viewing the overriding organising principle as an epistemic emergent property of lower features insofar as we are, currently, unable to explain or predict it in terms of lower level features. This is not to say, however, that we will never achieve such a reductive analysis.
Are we forced, then, to choose between single part constitution theory and organising principle theory? I think not. Reconciliation comes when we view the brain as an extremely important subsidiary organising principle that is itself subservient to the overriding organising principle. Although altering the overriding organising principle is a sufficient condition for changing specific identity, it is not a necessary one. Specific identity may also be changed by altering one or more subsidiary organising principles. The pyramidal shape of subsidiary organising principles necessitates a trickle down effect with change in one subsidiary organising principle meaning change in the arrangement of lower parts and subsidiary organising principles which, likewise, mean change in yet lower parts/subsidiary organising principles. The higher up the pyramid alteration takes place, the greater the change in overall arrangement of the whole and this explains, on account of its high place in the pyramid, the drastic change occasioned by brain xenotransplantation.
This raises the question of how much, or what sort of, alteration is necessary for a change in specific identity. If ones heart is moved an inch to the right ones spatial arrangement changes but it is absurd to say the same of ones specific identity. To change specific identity a new spatial arrangement must change functional arrangement and not all changes in functional arrangement will suffice. The enhancement of a previously existing function is insufficient, for after a course of steroids I am still a human being. Similarly, the loss of a previously existing function is insufficient, for one remains a human being after ones kidneys stop working . Specific identity changes only when the host acquires a new functional capacity (e.g. a child with functioning wings) not naturally found in her original species .
Taking this approach to specific identity with the non-controversial premise that a chimera results from changing the specific identity of an existing being or the eventual specific identity of a developing being, we are now ready to examine some contemporary definitions of chimera. These can usually be understood as an answer to four questions: what, when, who and how . Does it matter what we are mixing, be it cells, tissues, organs, gametes, genes and so on? Does it matter when in the life of the host this mixing takes place? Must the process be man-made and, if so, which human interventions count?
For Glenn, a chimera is created by splicing together genes from different species. This specification of gene splicing means an extremely narrow answer to our questions, with xenotransplants, stem cell grafts, cloning and artificial insemination all ruled out. Robert and Baylis use a much broader definition, aptly summarised by Greely as a single biological entity that is composed of a mixing of materials from two or more different organisms , while Karpowicz, Cohen and van der Kooy, specifying the combination of material from two different sources into one , offer a seemingly identical definition. Such definitions may appear ridiculous, for not only are stem cells, genes, gametes, organs, xenotransplants, xenografts, gene splicing, cloning and selective breeding brought under this huge umbrella but so, it seems, is digestion of plant or animal material. Such condemnation, however, misses a crucial distinction between four sorts of unity . Aggregative unity results when different materials are only put next to each other (e.g a pile of bricks) although if these materials are joined together we have concretive unity (e.g. two bricks glued together). Going beyond this, integrative unity requires that one material is somehow subsumed into the other so that only one of the materials is left (e.g. eating). Yet beyond this, substantial unity requires that the two materials combine to create a new thing, distinct in nature from either any of the original materials (e.g. a zygote) . One supposes, for the sake of charity, that RBs single biological entity and KCKs combination refer only to the result of substantial unity and so dont include someone just after lunchtime.
However, if RB and KCKs definitions encompass only substantial unity then the what and when of their definitions will need to be amended to exclude adult xenotransplants and gene therapy in adults. As it is, their explicit inclusion, in KCKs case of adult xenotransplants and in RBs of both adult xenotransplants and some gene therapy in adults , suggests an apparent inability to distinguish between alterations that affect the intrinsic nature of an organism by the addition of a new function and those whose effect on the overall arrangement does not reach this level. Now as Newman points out, the tissues of a developed organism are in some sense modular so that if blood, skin or a liver is diseased or damaged it can be replaced by a substitute without changing the nature of the individual . Put in the language of organising principle theory, this means that the switching of tissues and genes between adults of different species will mean, at most, some relatively minor change in arrangement and cannot result in the acquisition of new function and a change in specific identity. Transplanting a pig heart valve into a man results in nothing more than a man with a pig heart valve not a man pig, a pig man, or something that is one part pig and nine parts man. Another way of putting the point is that adult xenotransplants or gene therapy result at most in an integrative sort of unity in which the donor material is subsumed into the nature of the host which, as a result, remains intrinsically unchanged by the procedure.
To our and Newmans remarks should, however, be added an exception in the case of xenotransplanting whole brains or large numbers of undissociated neural cells . To say that, in substituting brains or parts of brains, we are simply exchanging modules ignores the pyramidal shape of subsidiary organising principles. Given its high position in said pyramid, the successful transplantation of large numbers of undissociated neural cells across species is almost guaranteed to create a new function in the host organism. In the case of brain xenotransplanting in adult organisms, the exception appears hypothetical for the scientific consensus appears to be that, as Dr Carson says quite simply, its not going to happen . Adults aside, the exception is borne out by Le Dourian and Balabons xenotransplantation, in post differentiation embryos, of a region of developing quail brain into a chick to successfully produce quail crowing capacities in a chicks body . For reasons that will shortly be explained, the transplantation of small numbers of undissociated cells will, however, not have an impact of this gravity.
Regarding the question of how, I believe KCK and RB are right to go beyond Glenn in including processes other than gene splicing like cloning or the grafting of stem cells. Gene splicing across species creates drastic change in overall arrangement partly because of when it is undertaken. As Newman describes, intervention at the embryonic stage changes the generative trajectory of the individual , turning it into something intrinsically different from what would normally have developed. It seems strange, then, not to expect such radical change from other interventions, like cloning or some stem cell grafts, undertaken at the embryonic stage. Who would deny that the fusion of goat and sheep embryos to produce geep exhibiting goat characteristics in a sheeps body or visa versa , has produced as radical a change in arrangement as any instance of gene splicing? Strictly speaking, however, not all intervention at the embryonic stage will produce such radical change and an exception regarding small numbers of undissociated cells is, one can safely assume, implicit in Newmans assertion. Current research suggests that these will be commandeered by the host for its own purposes thus effecting no change in the functional arrangement of the host . Quite at which point the number of undissociated cells becomes large enough to cause a relevant change in functional arrangement is, however, as yet unclear. All the forms of developmental modification listed above will have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the change in arrangement is radical enough to produce a new function in the organism. They are then included in our answer to the how question as ways in which one could (as opposed to will) create a chimera.
I define a chimera, then, as the product of any process that changes either the overall arrangement of some existing thing or the final overall arrangement of a developing thing so that the host acquires a new functional capacity not naturally found in her original species. Combining this with available scientific evidence, it follows that no type of approach will definitely produce a chimera but that the only approaches that could create chimera will involve either intervention at the pre-differentiation embryonic stage or the grafting of either an entire brain or sufficiently large numbers of undissociated neural cells at the post-differentiation embryonic or adult stage across species. Regarding these approaches, whether or not a chimera has been produced will have to be determined on a case-by-case examination of particular attempts.
Chapter Three
Chimera Welfare
There are five overlapping ethical objections to the creation of chimera: 1) Unnaturalness; 2) Species Integrity; 3) Moral Taboo; 4) Environmental Risk and 5) Chimera Welfare. This chapter will briefly outline the first four, before arguing that considerations of chimera welfare provides us with a strong reason against the creation of some, but not all, chimera.
According to the argument from unnaturalness it is simply not our place to intervene in the basic mechanisms of nature. Critics of this view often challenge the coherence of any distinction between nature and human convention and the implicit assumption that nature is perfect as it is . Furthermore, it is often argued that, ad absurdum, the argument leads us to condemn as immoral the damning of rivers and the ploughing of fields.
Sometimes considered a narrower interpretation of the unnaturalness argument, the argument from species integrity represents a realist position in which species are natural kinds whose distinction from each other we are under a moral imperative to respect. Against this view it is often argued that the idea of species is nothing more than a convenient system of classification and that anyway, the mere existence of something does not imply a moral imperative to maintain it .
The argument from moral taboo appeals to a common and intuitive disgust at the creation of chimeras. Such moral taboos, on this account, serve important social functions with taboos against incest, for example, guaranteeing a healthy level of genetic diversity in the community . In response critics counter that few (if any) taboos remain constant across time and cultures, taboos against crossing species boundaries being no exception. Many past (e.g. Ancient Egyptian) and some present (e.g Hinduism) religions contain, or contained, gods who appear to combine, in their form, human elements with those of other species .
The Environmental Risk argument appeals to consequential considerations for the ecosystem and therefore the survival of our species. In making biological mixtures for which there is no natural precedent we have no idea what to expect. Chimeras may act as half-way houses between species for diseases or, breaking out of laboratories, may breed with other species and upset the delicate balance of the ecosystem. Objections to the argument centre round the extent to which risk can be minimized and the outweighing of such risk by potential benefits .
The Chimera Welfare argument thinks experimentation should be restricted by obligations, both to existing individuals and to those individuals one wants to design and create. Creating some chimeras is wrong because it neglects said obligations. Exactly what obligations do we have to existing sentient individuals? A good place to start is current restrictions, informed consent aside, regarding human test subjects. The International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, published by The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), states four ethical principles . Respect for persons calls for the protection of dependent and vulnerable persons with impaired or diminished autonomy against harm or abuse . Beneficence demands that risks be reasonable compared to expected benefits while nonmaleficence proscribes the deliberate infliction of harm on persons . Finally, distributive justice requires the equitable distribution of both the burdens and the benefits of participation in research and that difference in distribution be justified by some morally relevant distinction between persons . These principles form reasonable restrictions regarding human test subjects who are incapable of informed consent. Indeed, acceptance of such principles appears so widespread that even systematic offenders against them, such as Nazi scientists, did not openly reject them but argued that the principles did not apply because their test subjects were sub-human.
The traditional response to the Nazi scientist is to argue that the test subjects were indeed members of our own species. A more radical approach, however, is to question the assumption that membership of our species is a necessary or sufficient condition to be protected by the CIOMS principles. Why not replace persons with sentients and extend the principles to all sentient creatures? In taking this line I am adopting Singers famous call to extend to other species the basic principle of equality understood as equal consideration of interests . If we oppose the restriction of this principle to one race then, Singer argues, we must oppose its restriction to one species . Any attempt to restrict its extension to ownership of a particular mental or physical attribute is arbitrary because one can always ask, why this attribute and not another ? Furthermore, any attempt to restrict extension to human beings faces the problem that any characteristic basic enough to include every human being will also include many animals . On the other hand, any attempt to choose an attribute that will exclude these animals will also exclude many human beings like young infants and severely mentally disabled infants or adults . Singer dismisses out of hand, tying the principle of equality to the simple fact of species membership on the grounds that this is analogous to tying it to membership of a particular race . The capacity for suffering as a necessary and sufficient condition for having interests is, for Singer, the only reasonable boundary .
A large number of those who wish to limit the basic principle of equality to our own species do this on the grounds of a special human dignity not found in other species. This concept has its roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition and is traditionally justified by mans position in the great chain of being where he has dominion over animals . Other justifications include souls, a likeness to God and Jesus Incarnation in a human body . Secular versions of human dignity have their roots in Kants avowal that only rational beings have unconditional and incomparable worth or dignity because they are capable of moral agency . Unfortunately, modern secular conceptions often never define human dignity , and so leave us wondering why it is not extended to animals, or define it in such a way that many arbitrary qualifications are needed to avoid the exclusion of infants and severe mental defectives. Conceptions of human dignity can detract from animal welfare by either implying that, in a conflict of human and animal interests, it is morally permissible to favor humans or by suggesting that only human interests are morally relevant.
Human dignity aside, an alternative response to our position is to consider, as does Michael Allen Fox , the moral community in terms of a social contract model. Building upon Kants stress on moral agency, Fox argues that moral obligation can only exist within a moral community consisting of a series of mutual guarantees, by tacit agreement, of nonintervention in the self-governing lives of others . However, to participate in a mutual guarantee one must be able to understand and implement ones own side of the bargain. In short, to be the subject of moral obligations you must be capable of moral agency. To be a moral agent one must be autonomous which, for Fox, requires not only critical self awareness; the ability to manipulate complex concepts and to use a sophisticated language but also the capacity to reflect, plan, deliberate, choose, and accept responsibility for acting . Not being autonomous, animals are incapable of moral agency and thus are not subjects of moral obligation. Given its necessity to participation in any contract and its description in terms of a cluster of features, Foxs stipulation of moral agency appears to avoid Singers usual charge of arbitrariness.
Its seems, however, that Foxs argument still sets the bar for membership of the moral community so high that many normal infants, severely mentally defective infants and adults are denied membership. Foxs reply is that normal infants are brought under the protection of the moral community because they have autonomy in latency . It is briefly suggested that severely mentally disabled adults and infants should be protected because this provides a form of insurance for moral agents should they, through illness or injury, lose their own autonomy . Putting aside, for charity, problems with the moral relevance of potential in normal infants, the idea of insurance works well for adults who have lost their autonomy through accident or illness. However, Fox needs to find some other way of justifying moral obligation towards severely mentally deficient infants which have no latent autonomy and whose protection is not prudential for moral agents: a forty-year-old man is not afraid of becoming a mentally deficient four-year-old. Foxs answer is two-fold. Firstly it is argued that our intuition in favour of moral preference for members of our immediate family justifies moral preference for our human family . For additional support, Fox adopts John Passmores account of a chain of love and concern that extends down the generations and includes the places, institutions and forms of activity that constitute our day-to-day existence. Though not explicitly put, the thought seems to be that moral agents care for their descendents who may turn out to be mentally defective infants, therefore the protection of mentally defective infants is in fact another form of prudence.
The first part of this argument will not wash. Fox needs to assume that the original intuition is based on our biological relation to immediate family members, in which case the intuition would also justify racism. However, the intuition is based upon the relationships built with family members (natural or adopted) and thus does not extend to strangers from our own species. Furthermore, the intuition justifies moral preference regarding superogatory acts as opposed to basic moral obligations . It will justify buying family members, but not strangers, birthday cards but will not justify stealing from strangers. Foxs second argument needs to take account of the fact that, given the progress of biotechnology, one of my distant descendents may be genetically altered so that moral agents do not consider the resulting chimera wholly human. Given this, it seems that concern for ones descendents must in fact lead us to extend the basic principle of equality to all sentient creatures.
Having established our moral obligations to existing organisms the question arises as to what obligations we have to organisms that will come into existence as a result of our design and creation. In answer to this I would like to adopt a slightly altered version of Bernard Rollins Principle of Conservation which states that it is not morally permissible to bring into existence a creature whose expected quality of life (as a result of the developmental modification) is likely to be lower than is normal for the hosts parent stock . If an alteration in functional capacities lowers quality of life below this point it is most likely due to the frustration of telos. Telos is an originally Aristotelian concept, according to which each species of animal has a natural way of life consisting of a series of ends or activities, some of which are shared by other species and some of which are species specific . Individual organisms are instinctively driven to fulfil these, with success in the enterprise creating contentment and failure creating suffering. If our previous argument about extending the basic principle of equality is accepted then the Principle of Conservation applies to all possible sentient creations.
Before moving on let us deal briefly with some objections that may be made to The Principle of Conservation. One objection is that a creature must exist before it can be harmed or benefited and so the act of creation itself does neither good nor evil to the organism in question . It may be responded that this objection rests upon the broad assumption that all moral wrongs involve wronging individuals when there are certain things, such as destroying the last instance of a rare orchid, which we consider wrong independently of harm to individuals . Against this it will likely be countered that such victimless wrongs still derive their wrongness from effects upon individuals. If I destroy the orchid many people will lose the chance to experience its beauty while my contribution to the lack of biodiversity harms the environment and thus all individuals living in it. To truly silence the objector it is tempting to argue intuitively using a thought experiment in which, when crushing the orchid, I am the last sentient individual in the universe. Such refutation is not necessary, however, for the key problem with this objection is its implicit assumption that actions can only be wrong due to effects upon identifiable individuals . Parfit , however, recognises that such a view would commit us to regarding many future actions, such as setting a bomb under St. Salvators quad to go off in fifty years, as morally neutral because they dont harm or benefit identifiable individuals . Many of the victims are unidentifiable because their identities will be the result of decisions made between now and then but it seems absurd to say that they cannot therefore be harmed.
It may also be objected that measuring quality of life to any useful degree involves an understanding of the consciousness involved and, as such, is obviously impossible when that consciousness does not yet exist. In answer to this I take what Degrazia calls an objective view of wellbeing according to which judgment of the future organisms quality of life is based upon her chances of achieving species-typical levels of mental and physical functioning . This approach maintains a subjective element, however, insofar as the degree to which the future organism is likely meet these standards gives us some idea how good or bad life will be from its own perspective.
Accepting the Principle for the Conservation of Welfare, it follows that, when our normative principles are combined with the definition of chimera reached in the first chapter, we will judge the moral permissibility of creating chimeras on a case-by-case basis. Chimeras resulting from intervention in the embryo (pre-differentiation) will be judged by the New Principle for the Conservation of Welfare and in doing so we must understand three crucial points. Firstly, not all new functional capacities change telos; secondly, those which do not may either help, hinder, or not effect fulfilment of the existing telos and thirdly, relative to physiology, changes in the telos may either preserve or diminish welfare. That some alterations in arrangement do not change telos is intuitively obvious given that telos is psychologically determined and, for example, whether or not an individual has wings will not affect her underlying psychology. Such a change would not change telos but does provide us with an example of a non-telos-changing alteration in arrangement that would help the organism fulfil its current telos. Accomplishing ones ends or goals would be a lot easier if one had wings and the same would seem to apply to individuals with, say, sonar or night vision. An example of a non-telos-changing alteration in arrangement that would not affect the organisms ability to fulfil its telos might be an omnicow: a cow who can also digest meat. Such an alteration would have no effect upon telos because, while it does not interfere with the normal activities of a cow, neither does it give the omnicow an advantage in fulfilling her ends. On the other hand, one non-telos-changing alteration in arrangement that would probably hinder the fulfilment of telos might be a dog with a sharks tail in place of its two back legs. This sharog would seriously struggle to accomplish its ends upon land and, though the tail might help him swim a little faster, this is of little consequence, there being nothing in an average dogs telos that requires swimming. Those deviations in a chimera from the standard functional arrangement of its species which produce a fundamentally different underlying psychology may change the telos for good or bad. A change in telos is a change for good insofar as something has been added to the original telos and it is ensured, perhaps through simultaneous changes in physical arrangement of the organism, that the organism is capable of fulfilling the new aspects of its telos. To use a concrete example, intervention in a cat embryo to create a catman with the desire, in addition to a normal cat telos, to communicate with language is permissible insofar as the catmans design includes whatever physical augmentation is necessary to use a complex language.
Regarding chimeras resulting from xenografts of large parts of the brain in post-differentiated embryos or adults, these will be judged by our version of the four CIOMS principles which implicitly include considerations of telos. To use a concrete example, let us examine the quail-chicken chimeras referred to in chapter one. This case appears to violate at least half of our principles for research on those incapable of consent. The exploitation of the chickens is contrary to both distributive justice and the principle of beneficience because there is no equal distribution of the burdens and benefits of participation and the chickens involved are put at great risk while appearing to gain nothing from the experiments. Whether their creation is contrary to respect for sentients and non-malefience will depend on whether the quail chickens biology allows it to fulfil whatever quail ends it is conscious of . Given that chicken and quail physiology appear broadly similar one would guess that it would be able to fulfil these but, pending an exact comparison, we reserve final judgment.
Creating a chimera from a brain xenograft, we might think, would be permissible if it made the host far more intelligent. Here we should be cautious, however, and remember that intelligence by itself does not increase welfare and may actually reduce it. Not only can intelligence increase suffering through an increased knowledge of ones situation but also, as we have seen, by adding something to the telos which the body is incapable of satisfying. If a xenograft designed to increase intelligence changes the telos of the chimera in question from the parent stock, the same rule applies as to the humanzee created by developmental modification. Telos may only be expanded if it is combined with physical augmentation which ensures that the new telos can be fulfilled. If this condition, along with our version of the four CIOMS principle, is satisfied then the sentient in question could benefit from a brain xenograft and the creation of this chimera might be permissible.
Having established that creation of certain chimeras is wrong, the question arises as to how this wrongness is to be interpreted. To one extreme we might mean wrong in a strict deontological sense where it is always impermissible and no room is allowed for mitigating factors. To the other extreme we might mean wrong in a consequentialist sense which allows that wrongness to be outweighed by other consequences in the pursuit of a greater good or the avoidance of a greater evil. The key question for whatever sense we choose is whether the means can ever justify the ends or, to be more specific, whether the creation of such chimeras might be justified if they led to extremely valuable medical advances. There is not space here for a full answer to this question and so it will suffice to leave the reader to make up her own mind on this. In doing so she should, however, be cautioned that the fact that our normative principles centre upon negative duties not to inflict pain and suffering does not necessarily imply as a bedrock a Utilitarian system which includes positive duties to increase the overall welfare of all sentient creatures.
Our objection from Chimera Welfare argues that we have obligations both to existing sentient individuals and those individuals we bring into existence by our creation and design. These obligations are extended to all individuals (sentient individuals in the first case) regardless of species. Two sets of principles constitute the content of these obligations. Firstly, our version of the CIOMS principles prohibit, in the case of existing sentient creatures, intervention where any benefit to the creature is outweighed by its harms and burdens. Secondly, the Principle for the Conservation of Welfare prohibits the creation by developmental modification of any chimera whose expected quality of life will be lower than that of the hosts parent stock. Given limitation of length, the nature of these prohibitions whether they are absolute and, if not, in what scenarios they might be overridden is here left to the judgment of the reader.
Chapter Four
Conclusion
It is taken as axiomatic that a chimera results from changing the specific identity of an existing being, or the eventual specific identity of a developing being. Any good definition of chimera must then proceed from a proper understanding of what determines specific identity. When we see that an individuals specific identity is determined by their functional arrangement it follows, then, that chimera result from changing the functional arrangement of an existing being or the eventual functional arrangement of a developing being. Functional arrangement is considered changed following the addition of a new functional capacity and so a creature will be considered a chimera if her existing (or eventual in the case of developing beings) functional arrangement is thus augmented. The scientific evidence suggests that such augmentation could only be achieved by developmental modification at the pre-differentiation embryonic stage or the grafting of large numbers of undissociated neural cells at the post-differentiation embryonic stage. Whether a particular intervention has created a chimera will be judged on a case-by-case basis.
Any body of laws regarding chimera should take into account that we have moral obligations both towards existing creatures and those creatures we wish to design and create. In the first case these obligations are the same four CIOMS principles which restrict our use of human test subjects who are incapable of consent. The principles can broadly be summarised as the demand that intervention must cause more benefit than harm to the creature involved. In the second case we must ensure that the creature created is likely to have a quality of life no lower than that found naturally in its parent stock. Finally, how a body of laws takes these obligations into account will depend upon how the wrongness of the violation is understood. This is a difficult question which there is not space to discuss here, and so the interpretation of exactly what is meant by wrong is left to the reader.
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S. A. Newman, Human Development Modification: Prospects and Perils, Submitted to the Presidents Council on Bioethics by The Council for Responsible Genetics, (April 2003)
Presidents Council for Bioethics, Council Discussion: Section 6 Human-Animal Chimeras, March 4 2005, Transcript
D. B. Resnik, Patents on Human-Animal Chimeras and Threats to Human Dignity, American Journal of Bioethics, Vol 3 Number 3 Summer 2003
J. S. Robert and F. Baylis, Crossing Species Boundaries, American Journal of Bioethics, Vol. 3 Number 3 Summer 2003
Rollin, The Frankenstein Syndrome, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995)
T. Seyfer, The Ethics of Chimeras and Hybrids, Ethics and Medicine, Vol. 29 Number 8, (August 2004)
P. Singer, Animal Liberation, (London, Pimlico, 1995)
P. Singer, All Animals are Equal, in H. Kuhse and P. Singer, Bioethics: An Anthology, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1999)
Introduction
Advances in science and technology lend immediacy to metaphysical and ethical questions which have long appeared abstract and hypothetical. Questions about the specific identity, and ethical permissibility, of creating geep (goat/sheep chimera), quail-chicks and humanzees were once limited to science fiction but now fall squarely into the domain of applied philosophy. We have either already created these creatures or will very likely, in the case of the humanzee , be able to do so in the near future. There is, then, an urgent need for a consistent body of law to govern the creation of chimeras.
Not being a work of law, this paper does not attempt to specify the content of such legislation but aims, rather, to aid others in doing so by giving clear answers to two important questions. The first question is: what counts as a chimera? In answer to this we will define specific identity in terms of functional arrangement and then examine which interventions inherently change said arrangement. The second question is: can a good argument against be made, from the point of view of chimera welfare, against the creation of some or all chimera? In answer to this it will be argued that the creation of some chimera runs contrary to our moral obligations to a) previously existing creatures and b) those creatures we wish to design and create. It is suggested that the content of these obligations form the core of the aforementioned laws, though the strength of these obligations against other moral considerations is here left to the interpretation of the reader.
Chapter 2
Defining Chimeras
Confusion dogs description of the chimera in Greek mythology. Everyone agrees it was a fire-breathing creature, part lion, part goat, part dragon, killed by the hero Bellerephon whilst riding Pegasus . Consensus breaks down, though, on whether the chimera had the heads of three different species or was, as Homer says, in the fore part a lion, in the hinder a serpent, and in the middle a goat . This dissonance is mirrored, as Greely notes , by the variety of definitions for the chimera in modern science. By combining an explanation of specific identity (identity with a kind of type) with a critique of contemporary definitions of chimera, this chapter will attempt to shed some light on the issue and advance an alternative definition of chimera.
What, in general, determines the specific identity of material objects? Three candidates are: first, what something is made of (composition), second, the set of parts it has (constitution) and third, how its parts are arranged (organising principle) . Arrangement is taken here to mean, beyond its common spatial sense, the functional relations of parts to each other and to that surrounding them which, for organisms, is their environment.
Composition will have to be discarded, because for any kind (e.g. tables) individual instances of that kind can be made from a variety of different materials (e.g. plastic, wood, metal).
Initially it seems that constitution must also be discarded, due to its failure to distinguish between things with identical, yet differently arranged, parts. When an identical number of identical bricks are used, in one case to make a church, and in another to make an air raid shelter, constitution fails to see that the buildings belong to separate kinds.
For species, however, constitution may be saved if we determine specific identity, not by a set of parts, but rather by one single part which, in the case of mammals, might be the brain. We obviously do not mean that species identity is determined by simply having a brain, but rather by having a particular type of brain. In this sense something with one type of brain is a human, something with another type of brain is a cat, while something with yet another type of brain is a dog. The question then arises as to what makes a particular brain the type of brain it is. To say that, for instance, it is a human brain because it is the sort of brain possessed by humans will create an irresolvable circularity in which type of brain both determines species and is itself determined by species . We are forced, once again, to choose between composition, constitution and organising principle. Composition and constitution (sets), as we have already seen, will not do, while single part constitution theory just leads us to ask of that single part of the brain, what determines its specific identity and so on, ad infinitum, for the part of the part of the part. Organising principle is the only suitable candidate left but, if it can determine the specific identity of a part, why cant it determine the specific identity of the whole? This possibility is made even more attractive because single part constitution theory is incapable of determining the specific identity of material objects. It seems quite impossible, for example, to name one part common to all tables.
Organising principle theory provides as good an answer for tables as it does for species and, unlike constitution (of sets), also manages to distinguish between the church and the air raid shelter. Furthermore, organising principle theory allows us to say that those individuals missing any particular part(s) (e.g. those without legs) or who possess a part(s) but without its/their normal function(s) (e.g. those whose kidneys dont work) are still members, albeit deficient members , of our species so long as that which is not missing or malfunctioning is arranged in accordance with the relevant organising principle.
An important distinction must be made between the one overriding organising principle and potentially numerous subsidiary organising principles. Take the human body in which the nucleus of a cell, insofar as it determines the arrangement of the cells parts, is an organising principle. This is merely a subsidiary organising principle because its arrangement, and that which it gives to other parts of the cell, is derived from a higher organising principle. The human body has a pyramid of subsidiary organising principles and it is tempting to think that the brain sits at the top as the overriding organising principle. This cannot be the case, however, for our knowledge of embryology shows that arrangement of parts is determined prior to brain formation.
The overriding organising principle is not identical with one dominant part but is, in a non-platonic sense, the form involved, i.e. the chairness of the chair, the humanness of the human being and so on. Where does this form come from though? Regarding chairs we can point to an idea shared by chair designers but what about particular species? Religious explanations aside, a tempting answer is genetic structure, or more specifically DNA, but this assumes there is some set of DNA shared exclusively by members of a species. Current studies indicate otherwise, for though the Human Genome Projects standard human genome is meant to be 99.9% identical to each individual human genome (RBp4), there is no 99.9% of any individuals DNA that is shared exclusively with members of her species. One solution to the problem might be viewing the overriding organising principle as an epistemic emergent property of lower features insofar as we are, currently, unable to explain or predict it in terms of lower level features. This is not to say, however, that we will never achieve such a reductive analysis.
Are we forced, then, to choose between single part constitution theory and organising principle theory? I think not. Reconciliation comes when we view the brain as an extremely important subsidiary organising principle that is itself subservient to the overriding organising principle. Although altering the overriding organising principle is a sufficient condition for changing specific identity, it is not a necessary one. Specific identity may also be changed by altering one or more subsidiary organising principles. The pyramidal shape of subsidiary organising principles necessitates a trickle down effect with change in one subsidiary organising principle meaning change in the arrangement of lower parts and subsidiary organising principles which, likewise, mean change in yet lower parts/subsidiary organising principles. The higher up the pyramid alteration takes place, the greater the change in overall arrangement of the whole and this explains, on account of its high place in the pyramid, the drastic change occasioned by brain xenotransplantation.
This raises the question of how much, or what sort of, alteration is necessary for a change in specific identity. If ones heart is moved an inch to the right ones spatial arrangement changes but it is absurd to say the same of ones specific identity. To change specific identity a new spatial arrangement must change functional arrangement and not all changes in functional arrangement will suffice. The enhancement of a previously existing function is insufficient, for after a course of steroids I am still a human being. Similarly, the loss of a previously existing function is insufficient, for one remains a human being after ones kidneys stop working . Specific identity changes only when the host acquires a new functional capacity (e.g. a child with functioning wings) not naturally found in her original species .
Taking this approach to specific identity with the non-controversial premise that a chimera results from changing the specific identity of an existing being or the eventual specific identity of a developing being, we are now ready to examine some contemporary definitions of chimera. These can usually be understood as an answer to four questions: what, when, who and how . Does it matter what we are mixing, be it cells, tissues, organs, gametes, genes and so on? Does it matter when in the life of the host this mixing takes place? Must the process be man-made and, if so, which human interventions count?
For Glenn, a chimera is created by splicing together genes from different species. This specification of gene splicing means an extremely narrow answer to our questions, with xenotransplants, stem cell grafts, cloning and artificial insemination all ruled out. Robert and Baylis use a much broader definition, aptly summarised by Greely as a single biological entity that is composed of a mixing of materials from two or more different organisms , while Karpowicz, Cohen and van der Kooy, specifying the combination of material from two different sources into one , offer a seemingly identical definition. Such definitions may appear ridiculous, for not only are stem cells, genes, gametes, organs, xenotransplants, xenografts, gene splicing, cloning and selective breeding brought under this huge umbrella but so, it seems, is digestion of plant or animal material. Such condemnation, however, misses a crucial distinction between four sorts of unity . Aggregative unity results when different materials are only put next to each other (e.g a pile of bricks) although if these materials are joined together we have concretive unity (e.g. two bricks glued together). Going beyond this, integrative unity requires that one material is somehow subsumed into the other so that only one of the materials is left (e.g. eating). Yet beyond this, substantial unity requires that the two materials combine to create a new thing, distinct in nature from either any of the original materials (e.g. a zygote) . One supposes, for the sake of charity, that RBs single biological entity and KCKs combination refer only to the result of substantial unity and so dont include someone just after lunchtime.
However, if RB and KCKs definitions encompass only substantial unity then the what and when of their definitions will need to be amended to exclude adult xenotransplants and gene therapy in adults. As it is, their explicit inclusion, in KCKs case of adult xenotransplants and in RBs of both adult xenotransplants and some gene therapy in adults , suggests an apparent inability to distinguish between alterations that affect the intrinsic nature of an organism by the addition of a new function and those whose effect on the overall arrangement does not reach this level. Now as Newman points out, the tissues of a developed organism are in some sense modular so that if blood, skin or a liver is diseased or damaged it can be replaced by a substitute without changing the nature of the individual . Put in the language of organising principle theory, this means that the switching of tissues and genes between adults of different species will mean, at most, some relatively minor change in arrangement and cannot result in the acquisition of new function and a change in specific identity. Transplanting a pig heart valve into a man results in nothing more than a man with a pig heart valve not a man pig, a pig man, or something that is one part pig and nine parts man. Another way of putting the point is that adult xenotransplants or gene therapy result at most in an integrative sort of unity in which the donor material is subsumed into the nature of the host which, as a result, remains intrinsically unchanged by the procedure.
To our and Newmans remarks should, however, be added an exception in the case of xenotransplanting whole brains or large numbers of undissociated neural cells . To say that, in substituting brains or parts of brains, we are simply exchanging modules ignores the pyramidal shape of subsidiary organising principles. Given its high position in said pyramid, the successful transplantation of large numbers of undissociated neural cells across species is almost guaranteed to create a new function in the host organism. In the case of brain xenotransplanting in adult organisms, the exception appears hypothetical for the scientific consensus appears to be that, as Dr Carson says quite simply, its not going to happen . Adults aside, the exception is borne out by Le Dourian and Balabons xenotransplantation, in post differentiation embryos, of a region of developing quail brain into a chick to successfully produce quail crowing capacities in a chicks body . For reasons that will shortly be explained, the transplantation of small numbers of undissociated cells will, however, not have an impact of this gravity.
Regarding the question of how, I believe KCK and RB are right to go beyond Glenn in including processes other than gene splicing like cloning or the grafting of stem cells. Gene splicing across species creates drastic change in overall arrangement partly because of when it is undertaken. As Newman describes, intervention at the embryonic stage changes the generative trajectory of the individual , turning it into something intrinsically different from what would normally have developed. It seems strange, then, not to expect such radical change from other interventions, like cloning or some stem cell grafts, undertaken at the embryonic stage. Who would deny that the fusion of goat and sheep embryos to produce geep exhibiting goat characteristics in a sheeps body or visa versa , has produced as radical a change in arrangement as any instance of gene splicing? Strictly speaking, however, not all intervention at the embryonic stage will produce such radical change and an exception regarding small numbers of undissociated cells is, one can safely assume, implicit in Newmans assertion. Current research suggests that these will be commandeered by the host for its own purposes thus effecting no change in the functional arrangement of the host . Quite at which point the number of undissociated cells becomes large enough to cause a relevant change in functional arrangement is, however, as yet unclear. All the forms of developmental modification listed above will have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the change in arrangement is radical enough to produce a new function in the organism. They are then included in our answer to the how question as ways in which one could (as opposed to will) create a chimera.
I define a chimera, then, as the product of any process that changes either the overall arrangement of some existing thing or the final overall arrangement of a developing thing so that the host acquires a new functional capacity not naturally found in her original species. Combining this with available scientific evidence, it follows that no type of approach will definitely produce a chimera but that the only approaches that could create chimera will involve either intervention at the pre-differentiation embryonic stage or the grafting of either an entire brain or sufficiently large numbers of undissociated neural cells at the post-differentiation embryonic or adult stage across species. Regarding these approaches, whether or not a chimera has been produced will have to be determined on a case-by-case examination of particular attempts.
Chapter Three
Chimera Welfare
There are five overlapping ethical objections to the creation of chimera: 1) Unnaturalness; 2) Species Integrity; 3) Moral Taboo; 4) Environmental Risk and 5) Chimera Welfare. This chapter will briefly outline the first four, before arguing that considerations of chimera welfare provides us with a strong reason against the creation of some, but not all, chimera.
According to the argument from unnaturalness it is simply not our place to intervene in the basic mechanisms of nature. Critics of this view often challenge the coherence of any distinction between nature and human convention and the implicit assumption that nature is perfect as it is . Furthermore, it is often argued that, ad absurdum, the argument leads us to condemn as immoral the damning of rivers and the ploughing of fields.
Sometimes considered a narrower interpretation of the unnaturalness argument, the argument from species integrity represents a realist position in which species are natural kinds whose distinction from each other we are under a moral imperative to respect. Against this view it is often argued that the idea of species is nothing more than a convenient system of classification and that anyway, the mere existence of something does not imply a moral imperative to maintain it .
The argument from moral taboo appeals to a common and intuitive disgust at the creation of chimeras. Such moral taboos, on this account, serve important social functions with taboos against incest, for example, guaranteeing a healthy level of genetic diversity in the community . In response critics counter that few (if any) taboos remain constant across time and cultures, taboos against crossing species boundaries being no exception. Many past (e.g. Ancient Egyptian) and some present (e.g Hinduism) religions contain, or contained, gods who appear to combine, in their form, human elements with those of other species .
The Environmental Risk argument appeals to consequential considerations for the ecosystem and therefore the survival of our species. In making biological mixtures for which there is no natural precedent we have no idea what to expect. Chimeras may act as half-way houses between species for diseases or, breaking out of laboratories, may breed with other species and upset the delicate balance of the ecosystem. Objections to the argument centre round the extent to which risk can be minimized and the outweighing of such risk by potential benefits .
The Chimera Welfare argument thinks experimentation should be restricted by obligations, both to existing individuals and to those individuals one wants to design and create. Creating some chimeras is wrong because it neglects said obligations. Exactly what obligations do we have to existing sentient individuals? A good place to start is current restrictions, informed consent aside, regarding human test subjects. The International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, published by The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), states four ethical principles . Respect for persons calls for the protection of dependent and vulnerable persons with impaired or diminished autonomy against harm or abuse . Beneficence demands that risks be reasonable compared to expected benefits while nonmaleficence proscribes the deliberate infliction of harm on persons . Finally, distributive justice requires the equitable distribution of both the burdens and the benefits of participation in research and that difference in distribution be justified by some morally relevant distinction between persons . These principles form reasonable restrictions regarding human test subjects who are incapable of informed consent. Indeed, acceptance of such principles appears so widespread that even systematic offenders against them, such as Nazi scientists, did not openly reject them but argued that the principles did not apply because their test subjects were sub-human.
The traditional response to the Nazi scientist is to argue that the test subjects were indeed members of our own species. A more radical approach, however, is to question the assumption that membership of our species is a necessary or sufficient condition to be protected by the CIOMS principles. Why not replace persons with sentients and extend the principles to all sentient creatures? In taking this line I am adopting Singers famous call to extend to other species the basic principle of equality understood as equal consideration of interests . If we oppose the restriction of this principle to one race then, Singer argues, we must oppose its restriction to one species . Any attempt to restrict its extension to ownership of a particular mental or physical attribute is arbitrary because one can always ask, why this attribute and not another ? Furthermore, any attempt to restrict extension to human beings faces the problem that any characteristic basic enough to include every human being will also include many animals . On the other hand, any attempt to choose an attribute that will exclude these animals will also exclude many human beings like young infants and severely mentally disabled infants or adults . Singer dismisses out of hand, tying the principle of equality to the simple fact of species membership on the grounds that this is analogous to tying it to membership of a particular race . The capacity for suffering as a necessary and sufficient condition for having interests is, for Singer, the only reasonable boundary .
A large number of those who wish to limit the basic principle of equality to our own species do this on the grounds of a special human dignity not found in other species. This concept has its roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition and is traditionally justified by mans position in the great chain of being where he has dominion over animals . Other justifications include souls, a likeness to God and Jesus Incarnation in a human body . Secular versions of human dignity have their roots in Kants avowal that only rational beings have unconditional and incomparable worth or dignity because they are capable of moral agency . Unfortunately, modern secular conceptions often never define human dignity , and so leave us wondering why it is not extended to animals, or define it in such a way that many arbitrary qualifications are needed to avoid the exclusion of infants and severe mental defectives. Conceptions of human dignity can detract from animal welfare by either implying that, in a conflict of human and animal interests, it is morally permissible to favor humans or by suggesting that only human interests are morally relevant.
Human dignity aside, an alternative response to our position is to consider, as does Michael Allen Fox , the moral community in terms of a social contract model. Building upon Kants stress on moral agency, Fox argues that moral obligation can only exist within a moral community consisting of a series of mutual guarantees, by tacit agreement, of nonintervention in the self-governing lives of others . However, to participate in a mutual guarantee one must be able to understand and implement ones own side of the bargain. In short, to be the subject of moral obligations you must be capable of moral agency. To be a moral agent one must be autonomous which, for Fox, requires not only critical self awareness; the ability to manipulate complex concepts and to use a sophisticated language but also the capacity to reflect, plan, deliberate, choose, and accept responsibility for acting . Not being autonomous, animals are incapable of moral agency and thus are not subjects of moral obligation. Given its necessity to participation in any contract and its description in terms of a cluster of features, Foxs stipulation of moral agency appears to avoid Singers usual charge of arbitrariness.
Its seems, however, that Foxs argument still sets the bar for membership of the moral community so high that many normal infants, severely mentally defective infants and adults are denied membership. Foxs reply is that normal infants are brought under the protection of the moral community because they have autonomy in latency . It is briefly suggested that severely mentally disabled adults and infants should be protected because this provides a form of insurance for moral agents should they, through illness or injury, lose their own autonomy . Putting aside, for charity, problems with the moral relevance of potential in normal infants, the idea of insurance works well for adults who have lost their autonomy through accident or illness. However, Fox needs to find some other way of justifying moral obligation towards severely mentally deficient infants which have no latent autonomy and whose protection is not prudential for moral agents: a forty-year-old man is not afraid of becoming a mentally deficient four-year-old. Foxs answer is two-fold. Firstly it is argued that our intuition in favour of moral preference for members of our immediate family justifies moral preference for our human family . For additional support, Fox adopts John Passmores account of a chain of love and concern that extends down the generations and includes the places, institutions and forms of activity that constitute our day-to-day existence. Though not explicitly put, the thought seems to be that moral agents care for their descendents who may turn out to be mentally defective infants, therefore the protection of mentally defective infants is in fact another form of prudence.
The first part of this argument will not wash. Fox needs to assume that the original intuition is based on our biological relation to immediate family members, in which case the intuition would also justify racism. However, the intuition is based upon the relationships built with family members (natural or adopted) and thus does not extend to strangers from our own species. Furthermore, the intuition justifies moral preference regarding superogatory acts as opposed to basic moral obligations . It will justify buying family members, but not strangers, birthday cards but will not justify stealing from strangers. Foxs second argument needs to take account of the fact that, given the progress of biotechnology, one of my distant descendents may be genetically altered so that moral agents do not consider the resulting chimera wholly human. Given this, it seems that concern for ones descendents must in fact lead us to extend the basic principle of equality to all sentient creatures.
Having established our moral obligations to existing organisms the question arises as to what obligations we have to organisms that will come into existence as a result of our design and creation. In answer to this I would like to adopt a slightly altered version of Bernard Rollins Principle of Conservation which states that it is not morally permissible to bring into existence a creature whose expected quality of life (as a result of the developmental modification) is likely to be lower than is normal for the hosts parent stock . If an alteration in functional capacities lowers quality of life below this point it is most likely due to the frustration of telos. Telos is an originally Aristotelian concept, according to which each species of animal has a natural way of life consisting of a series of ends or activities, some of which are shared by other species and some of which are species specific . Individual organisms are instinctively driven to fulfil these, with success in the enterprise creating contentment and failure creating suffering. If our previous argument about extending the basic principle of equality is accepted then the Principle of Conservation applies to all possible sentient creations.
Before moving on let us deal briefly with some objections that may be made to The Principle of Conservation. One objection is that a creature must exist before it can be harmed or benefited and so the act of creation itself does neither good nor evil to the organism in question . It may be responded that this objection rests upon the broad assumption that all moral wrongs involve wronging individuals when there are certain things, such as destroying the last instance of a rare orchid, which we consider wrong independently of harm to individuals . Against this it will likely be countered that such victimless wrongs still derive their wrongness from effects upon individuals. If I destroy the orchid many people will lose the chance to experience its beauty while my contribution to the lack of biodiversity harms the environment and thus all individuals living in it. To truly silence the objector it is tempting to argue intuitively using a thought experiment in which, when crushing the orchid, I am the last sentient individual in the universe. Such refutation is not necessary, however, for the key problem with this objection is its implicit assumption that actions can only be wrong due to effects upon identifiable individuals . Parfit , however, recognises that such a view would commit us to regarding many future actions, such as setting a bomb under St. Salvators quad to go off in fifty years, as morally neutral because they dont harm or benefit identifiable individuals . Many of the victims are unidentifiable because their identities will be the result of decisions made between now and then but it seems absurd to say that they cannot therefore be harmed.
It may also be objected that measuring quality of life to any useful degree involves an understanding of the consciousness involved and, as such, is obviously impossible when that consciousness does not yet exist. In answer to this I take what Degrazia calls an objective view of wellbeing according to which judgment of the future organisms quality of life is based upon her chances of achieving species-typical levels of mental and physical functioning . This approach maintains a subjective element, however, insofar as the degree to which the future organism is likely meet these standards gives us some idea how good or bad life will be from its own perspective.
Accepting the Principle for the Conservation of Welfare, it follows that, when our normative principles are combined with the definition of chimera reached in the first chapter, we will judge the moral permissibility of creating chimeras on a case-by-case basis. Chimeras resulting from intervention in the embryo (pre-differentiation) will be judged by the New Principle for the Conservation of Welfare and in doing so we must understand three crucial points. Firstly, not all new functional capacities change telos; secondly, those which do not may either help, hinder, or not effect fulfilment of the existing telos and thirdly, relative to physiology, changes in the telos may either preserve or diminish welfare. That some alterations in arrangement do not change telos is intuitively obvious given that telos is psychologically determined and, for example, whether or not an individual has wings will not affect her underlying psychology. Such a change would not change telos but does provide us with an example of a non-telos-changing alteration in arrangement that would help the organism fulfil its current telos. Accomplishing ones ends or goals would be a lot easier if one had wings and the same would seem to apply to individuals with, say, sonar or night vision. An example of a non-telos-changing alteration in arrangement that would not affect the organisms ability to fulfil its telos might be an omnicow: a cow who can also digest meat. Such an alteration would have no effect upon telos because, while it does not interfere with the normal activities of a cow, neither does it give the omnicow an advantage in fulfilling her ends. On the other hand, one non-telos-changing alteration in arrangement that would probably hinder the fulfilment of telos might be a dog with a sharks tail in place of its two back legs. This sharog would seriously struggle to accomplish its ends upon land and, though the tail might help him swim a little faster, this is of little consequence, there being nothing in an average dogs telos that requires swimming. Those deviations in a chimera from the standard functional arrangement of its species which produce a fundamentally different underlying psychology may change the telos for good or bad. A change in telos is a change for good insofar as something has been added to the original telos and it is ensured, perhaps through simultaneous changes in physical arrangement of the organism, that the organism is capable of fulfilling the new aspects of its telos. To use a concrete example, intervention in a cat embryo to create a catman with the desire, in addition to a normal cat telos, to communicate with language is permissible insofar as the catmans design includes whatever physical augmentation is necessary to use a complex language.
Regarding chimeras resulting from xenografts of large parts of the brain in post-differentiated embryos or adults, these will be judged by our version of the four CIOMS principles which implicitly include considerations of telos. To use a concrete example, let us examine the quail-chicken chimeras referred to in chapter one. This case appears to violate at least half of our principles for research on those incapable of consent. The exploitation of the chickens is contrary to both distributive justice and the principle of beneficience because there is no equal distribution of the burdens and benefits of participation and the chickens involved are put at great risk while appearing to gain nothing from the experiments. Whether their creation is contrary to respect for sentients and non-malefience will depend on whether the quail chickens biology allows it to fulfil whatever quail ends it is conscious of . Given that chicken and quail physiology appear broadly similar one would guess that it would be able to fulfil these but, pending an exact comparison, we reserve final judgment.
Creating a chimera from a brain xenograft, we might think, would be permissible if it made the host far more intelligent. Here we should be cautious, however, and remember that intelligence by itself does not increase welfare and may actually reduce it. Not only can intelligence increase suffering through an increased knowledge of ones situation but also, as we have seen, by adding something to the telos which the body is incapable of satisfying. If a xenograft designed to increase intelligence changes the telos of the chimera in question from the parent stock, the same rule applies as to the humanzee created by developmental modification. Telos may only be expanded if it is combined with physical augmentation which ensures that the new telos can be fulfilled. If this condition, along with our version of the four CIOMS principle, is satisfied then the sentient in question could benefit from a brain xenograft and the creation of this chimera might be permissible.
Having established that creation of certain chimeras is wrong, the question arises as to how this wrongness is to be interpreted. To one extreme we might mean wrong in a strict deontological sense where it is always impermissible and no room is allowed for mitigating factors. To the other extreme we might mean wrong in a consequentialist sense which allows that wrongness to be outweighed by other consequences in the pursuit of a greater good or the avoidance of a greater evil. The key question for whatever sense we choose is whether the means can ever justify the ends or, to be more specific, whether the creation of such chimeras might be justified if they led to extremely valuable medical advances. There is not space here for a full answer to this question and so it will suffice to leave the reader to make up her own mind on this. In doing so she should, however, be cautioned that the fact that our normative principles centre upon negative duties not to inflict pain and suffering does not necessarily imply as a bedrock a Utilitarian system which includes positive duties to increase the overall welfare of all sentient creatures.
Our objection from Chimera Welfare argues that we have obligations both to existing sentient individuals and those individuals we bring into existence by our creation and design. These obligations are extended to all individuals (sentient individuals in the first case) regardless of species. Two sets of principles constitute the content of these obligations. Firstly, our version of the CIOMS principles prohibit, in the case of existing sentient creatures, intervention where any benefit to the creature is outweighed by its harms and burdens. Secondly, the Principle for the Conservation of Welfare prohibits the creation by developmental modification of any chimera whose expected quality of life will be lower than that of the hosts parent stock. Given limitation of length, the nature of these prohibitions whether they are absolute and, if not, in what scenarios they might be overridden is here left to the judgment of the reader.
Chapter Four
Conclusion
It is taken as axiomatic that a chimera results from changing the specific identity of an existing being, or the eventual specific identity of a developing being. Any good definition of chimera must then proceed from a proper understanding of what determines specific identity. When we see that an individuals specific identity is determined by their functional arrangement it follows, then, that chimera result from changing the functional arrangement of an existing being or the eventual functional arrangement of a developing being. Functional arrangement is considered changed following the addition of a new functional capacity and so a creature will be considered a chimera if her existing (or eventual in the case of developing beings) functional arrangement is thus augmented. The scientific evidence suggests that such augmentation could only be achieved by developmental modification at the pre-differentiation embryonic stage or the grafting of large numbers of undissociated neural cells at the post-differentiation embryonic stage. Whether a particular intervention has created a chimera will be judged on a case-by-case basis.
Any body of laws regarding chimera should take into account that we have moral obligations both towards existing creatures and those creatures we wish to design and create. In the first case these obligations are the same four CIOMS principles which restrict our use of human test subjects who are incapable of consent. The principles can broadly be summarised as the demand that intervention must cause more benefit than harm to the creature involved. In the second case we must ensure that the creature created is likely to have a quality of life no lower than that found naturally in its parent stock. Finally, how a body of laws takes these obligations into account will depend upon how the wrongness of the violation is understood. This is a difficult question which there is not space to discuss here, and so the interpretation of exactly what is meant by wrong is left to the reader.
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